The Supernatural in the New Testament
f their possibility is conceded, they are so extremely improbable that it is a violation of the first principles of our reason to believe in their actual occurrence. The
e way of the acceptance of miracles, as actual occurrences, at
e possible, even on the principles of pantheism or atheism. But such objective fact would be no miracle in any sense in which the word can be used in this discussion. If the evidence was sufficiently strong to attest it as a fact, it [pg 125] would be explicable on the supposition of some unknown force in nature, or even as a purely chance occurrence. A miracle, in any sense in which it enters into t
mption of the existence of a personal God. It is also a proposition so clear as to render all proof of it superfluous
gation must be not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but i
ended. An adequate force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what name we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the power which rules the universe, i.e. God. As Mr. Mill justly observes, the only question which can be raised if the existence of God is assumed, is, not the want o
al science are a set of antecedents followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle does not interfere with this. Its very conception involves a new antecedent followed by its consequent. The utmost that can be urged is that we have never before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent and consequent, or that the antecedents
se if they were made to produce the opposite results to those which they actually produce. Thus, if a boiler were filled with water and a fire kindled under it, and no other force was present capable of neutralizing the action of the fire; if, instead of the temperature of the water being raised, it gradually froze, there woul
n that there is no force in the universe besides those which have been already recognized by us. This, however, science will in the present state of our knowledg
st operation. To take an illustration: It has been frequently said that the force of gravity must have been suspended in favour of Peter's body when he walked on the water, and in favour of that of our Lord when he ascended into heaven. But this is by no means the case. The mere suspension of the law of gravitation would not in either case have effected the results in question. The presence of other forces was
been frequently urged against the possibility of miracles that their performance must have thrown the whole mechanism of the universe into confusion, and involved an extensive reconstruction of the processes of nature. This would unquestionably be the case if the working
hese particular modifications of existing forces into activity. By means of it, the entire aspect of external nature has been changed from the appearance which it would have presented, if no other agency had existed besides the forces of nature which belong to matter. Man has been a power manifested in the midst of them. I am quite aware that he can create no new force, and that he can only control or modify the action of those which exist, but is never capable of suspending them. Yet this power has produced marv
nstance of counteracting the action of those forces which would produce a contrary result if left to themselves. It is quite unnecessary for us to determine, in reference to the subject under consideration, whether the result may be brought about by a combination of forces which energize within the v
o act of creation was necessary. All that was required was the presence of a force or forces, able to build up these materials into the forms in question. God does this in ordinary course by what we designate natural forces, by means of which
as it cannot be effected by any of the forces of nature with which we are acquainted, the p
are acquainted, how can their action be a violation of nature's order? If God is always present energizing in nature's forces, how can any fresh putting forth of his energy be a violation of nature's laws? In a certain sense of the words the order of nature may be said to be violated whenever one of
be so can only be determined when we are acquainted with the means by which such an event may be brought about. The assertion itself is a mere general st
t these results [pg 132] must follow, as long as the present forces which we observe and no others are in energy. But it would cease to be so as soon as any others capable of producing such a result were brought into activity. The truth is that death is a phenomenon which is caused by the joint action of a multitude of natural forces. But if these were overborne by any force of nature, or by the Author of nature calling any unknown force into activity, or even by the energy of his own creative will, it would be absurd to ca
re requires further consideration. What do we intend to affirm when
odified to the precise extent of the modification. As far then as the results in nature are the effect of known forces unmodified in their [pg 133] action by other forces, they follow a definite order. Thus all the motions of the heavenly bodies present themselves to the scientific mind as the perfection of order, because they are the results of the action of known forces acting in conformity with invariable law. Whenever a fact is observed wh
ch would have resulted from their unmodified action. Such modification therefore must produce a different order of nature from that which would have otherwise resulted. But such modifications
k; according as the different [pg 134] forces, which act on it, meet at the suitable time and place, the progress of disintegration is greatly lengthened or shortened. Such concurrences of events are what we view as pure contingencies. E.g. water penetrates into one of its fissures; this takes place in summer, and no appreciable result follows. But if in winter a frost happens immediately afterwards, it will produce an order of events widely different fr
integration, and modifies the whole of the results which follow. If the casual act of the bird had taken place at any other time or place, the whole series would have been different, varying with the causes which produced the seed, and the contingencies which brought the bird to the spot, and induced it to drop it. Let us now suppose that man with his r
ime in numbers passing all comprehension. In the case of many vegetable structures the result has been entirely modified by the contingency of some insect choosing to enter one flower and not to enter another; and according as this takes place a wholly different order of events follows. Whether we choose to designate such concurrences of events at the s
t for our purpose that man is capable of acting on nature and of producing most important changes in the results of the action of its forces. This being so, it is certain that an order of events takes place through the interference of man, quite different from that which would have taken place apart from his interference. But these interferences take place in conformity with no known law, and their results occasion a break in the previously existing series of events, by the introduction of a new one. Man, therefore, is capable of interfering with and effecting changes in the order of nature. It will be objected that all the agencies by which such results are brought about are forces energizing in nature in conformity with invariable la
st assumed that man is a portion of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of it. But the proof of this has certainly yet to be given. By the word "nature," as it is used by this philosophy, is meant the sum total of known material forces, acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; that is to say, of forces which are devoid of intelligence and volition. It is impossible in this sense o
results. It follows, therefore, that in either case a power exists which is capable of modifying the order of nature. Now it would be absurd to deny that whatever man can effect, God is able also to effect; and that He is so much the more able, in proportion as His knowledge is more perfect. Whether, therefore, God works in nature, or outside it, a power exists which is capable of varying the order of nature without interrupting the action of [pg 138] any of its forces, or violating its laws. He also must have ot
nfusion arising from the various senses in which the words "nature" and "natural law," and other similar expressions have been employed. Although the instances will be taken fr
sions, and not solutions of a difficulty. If the course of nature be interrupted in any way, whether the interruption be said to proceed from some cause which is said to be beyond, or beside, or above nature, it is certain that the interruption is not caused by nature itself; and every disturbance
nature," "beyond nature," or "above nature." But while the author criticises Dr. Newman, it i
cludes mind and all its phenomena. When we speak of interruptions in the order of nature, we usually intend it to be assumed that volition is the cause of these interruptions. This being so, the author has included in nature phenomena which differ so widely from one another as those of mind and matter. He then speaks of the chief characteristic of nature
e which is capable of controlling other portions of nature, and even of acting on itself. If man is excluded from nature, then there must exist a power outside nature, which is "beyond and above nature," and is capable of acting on it. But if by nature is meant the sum total of all the f
cannot proceed from nature itself. But this is certainly incorrect. Natural forces, that is to say, material ones, modify one another; and by their combined action, they produce a series of events quite different from what would be the result of their separate action. Such a new series of events is to all intents and purposes an interrupt
ill more evidently the case if we inc
n it is inferred that such interruption is a disturbance of the order of nature; and that every disturbance of its order is contrary to nature. The inference which the reader is left to draw,
ich I have already discussed. Such disturbances occur every day. It is, therefore, misleading to designate them as contrary to nature, as they neither necessarily suspend any natural force nor violate any natural law. I have already proved that there is not
nature should be disturbed." Here the ambiguity of the expressions used,
gnorant, and its action on the physical universe? What, again, is the precise meaning which can be attached to the word "unnatural" in such a context, where it is evident that its meaning must vary according as we include in nature one, several, or all of these phenomena? If by the word "unnatural" the meaning in
rain of wheat must be planted by man at the proper season. It must be cared for by him. Various physical forces must contribute to the growth and development of the plant. The ears produced must be reaped in harvest-time. This process must be repeated until the grains are sufficient in number to produce our intended loaf. Then they must be threshed, ground, prepared for the oven, baked. In one word, the miller and the baker must be invoked to control, combine, [pg 143] modify and give a new direction to the forces of nature under the d
ne single particle of matter. As to the nature of the forces employed to work the miracle the narrative says nothing. Nor does it imply that one of the ordinary forces of nature was suspended on the occasion. All that it asserts is the presence of a force adequate to build up the materials already existing into the forms of bread and fish, that force being God. In the manufacture of the loaves and in the catching of the fish, man had interfered with nature's order by the blending of her powe
is used in a great variety of senses. Its proper meaning is to denote an invariable sequence of phenomena. It is frequently made to include the conception of the force
gulated by the same laws as govern all the other forces of nature. If the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life, each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical law is suspended in precisely the same manner and to an equivalent degree, each time another physical law is called into action. The law of gravitation, for instance, is suspended by the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case a
ut a wholly different result apart from the action of man upon them. Though he suspends no physical force, the action of man has produced an order of events in nature different from that which would have taken place without it, but by balancing one against the other he modifies
gence and free agency? Unless man is a blind unintelligent force, although he be supposed to exist within nature, he belongs to an order wholly different from that of a plant or a crystal. To assert the contrary is to assume the whole question. The results [pg 146] produced by intellige
rces, and even frequently ascribes to them what is only true of intelligent forces. It must never be overlooked in this controversy that the laws of nature can effectuate nothing. Forces, not laws, produce results. The following sentence will be a correct expression of a truth, if we substitute "force" for "law:" "The law of gravitation is overcome by the lawimpulse, is from the moment when that power is exerted subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there is no instance producible, or even logically conceivab
te ruling of the forces of unintelligent nature. Numerous instances are not only logically conceivable, but actually producible. The occurrence, therefore, of anything opposed to the ultimate rulings of these unintelligent physical forces is not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only produce results through the agency of these physical forces; but he can modify their results, and so use them as to make them the means of effectuating his purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur o
e us may very properly be introduced, by quo
s based on the universality and invariability of law, and inexorably exclu
, He will never deviate. To alter or vary from this mode of acting implies that the machinery of the universe, through which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He has worked a miracle therefore involves the assumption that He has ceased from one mode of action and adopted another; or, in other words, that the forces of the universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the whole machin
of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the conception of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament as one of the means by which he realizes his
a God out of a number of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if it be one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of science, and theologians. The plain fact is, that man has no conceptions but human ones. To abandon these is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers and men of science speak of nature, they are obliged to apply
peated interference, and rejecting the supposition of arbitrary suspension of law, such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by theologians must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory to the wisdom and perfection which we recognize in the invariable order of nature. It is impossible for us to co
ene of His creative work, and to contemplate the results of its wonderful operations. Any intervention on His part would imply a defect in the construction of the machine. It follows therefore that the most perfect conception of God (if there be one) is that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally formed matter with its properties and forces acting in conformity with invariable law, and
can form of God. The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are destitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral nature, conscience, and spiritual affections. They may therefore when completed be left to themselves; and [pg 151] the more perfect the irrational machine may be, the more
is energy, His action in conformity with unchanging order is the worthiest conception of Him, and to assert that He ever has varied from this mode of action is to degrade Him. Such be
ction of both the material and the moral worlds. If this be so, one harmonious purpose, including the divine manifestations, both in the material and moral universe, may be carried out by a succession of progressive
of personality. It follows, therefore, that manifestations of Himself, under aspects suitable to moral beings, are as much to be expected as manifestations of His power or of His wisdom addressed to an intellectual nature. The supposition, therefore, that all His manifestations can only be made through the laws
t Himself in the moral as well as in the material universe. This is the more necessary, because philosophy is never wearied with telling us, that we
o create. It follows, therefore, even on the assumption of the truth of the Darwinian theory of creation, that a new order must have been introduced, when God first breathed life into the lowest forms of matter. But if He introduced a new order then, that is to say, when He fir
opposed to the idea of arbitrary interruption of law. The entire validity of these reasonings which we have been considering proceeds on the assumption that the argument requires this. I care not what some Christian apologists may have said on this subject. The New
er Mill was so capable of conceiving that if a supreme Being existed, the order of the universe would have been so wholly different from its present order, that it led him to affirm that the proof of His existence was altogether wanting.3 But intelligent Christians fully recogniz
tradict the laws of the universe, or respecting the divine character, which reason refuses to endorse. How far the known or unknown forces of nature may be employed in the performance of a miracle is an abstract question that we have no means of determining. The agency of some of the known forces of nature is unequivocally asserted in the Old Testament to have been the media employed in the performance of some of its miracles. No such affirmation is made in the New Testament. Still there is not one word
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