The Supernatural in the New Testament

r evidence. To prove that a revelation is both possible and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by miracles, may form an essential portion of our gener

same media as those through which other facts are established. To prove that a revelation is probable will not

ss expenditure of our reasoning powers; for no evidence can prove the occurrence of that which is impossible. It [pg 096] may be assumed, however, that those who make this affirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of their reasonings; because, after having demonstrated, as they allege, that miracles are impos

, or assuming the fact which ought to be proved. To avoid eve

ction of which we recognize intelligence and will. With the principles of atheism the occurrence of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because as it cannot rise to any higher knowledge than that of phenomena, the knowledge of the invariability of past phenomena

eism which does not affirm that no God exists, but contents itse

Such a being (if it is possible to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly making a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the result of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not say, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into unconsciousness. Prio

unknown and unknowable; [pg 098] and that everything within the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of his existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory, while it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and atheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God out of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of conscious self-manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited and finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists beyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned

velation of such a being can be made to the finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could be made, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, the person who attempts to reason out the truth of Christianity is placed under a difficulty. Christianity assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of moral attributes. This is the very truth, the evidence of which these systems assert to be wanting. The Christian advocate, therefore, has only two courses before him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but universal beli

ion when he assumes the existence of a personal God as the foundation of his reasonings, than the

ty the charge that they begin and end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous language has been used on thi

the assumption of a 'personal' God is not susceptible of proof; indeed,

which the truths of Euclid do to those of trigonometry? The latter is the fact though the mode in which the writer puts it implies the former. Without referring to the authority of any particular author, is he not fully aware that theists maintain that their belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which commends

of it, this conception of God was derived from revelation. Not from the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity in the world do we see in mankind at large any belief in such a Being." The learned author then states, at considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar views entertained

them the idea of God. It is simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the Bible. It is true that the existence of a primitive revelation anterior to the Bible has often been assumed to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare assumption of which we have no proof, and whose only basis is conjecture. Judaism and Christianity have been instrumental in widely spreading correct conceptions of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet if the conception had not existed in the mind at least implicitly, no formal revelation could have put it there, for every such revelation must be conveyed in language, and all language is meaningless, unless the mind can realize its conceptions. The assertion, [pg 102] therefore, that the conception of God has been first communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is afterwards proved by reason,

knowledge this peculiar or doctrinal conception of a God. We see in the structure of nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only operates and expresses itself by law. Nature only does and can inform us of mind in nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to the existence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a [pg 103] universal mind out of nature, nature says nothing; and of an omnipotence which does not possess an inherent limit in nature, she says nothing e

ly to point out the inaccura

s, intellectual and moral, and above all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or excluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a part of it? If they are included in nature, then there are other facts in nature bearing on the being of a God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If they are excluded, then the reasoning is in

similar principle which we experience in ourselves. Such an inference is not due to simple observation of the order of the universe only, but unites with it an act of reasoning founded on our own self-conscious being. But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we are cognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We therefore infer from the order and harmonies of nature, not simply the conception of a God, such as the

order of the material universe is [pg 105] valid to prove the presence of mind, which is a conception entirely derived from our consciousness of ourselves, it must be equally so to prove the existence of purpose and volition, for we know nothing of mind which is devoid of these attributes. The material universe proves that its order and harmony is the result of the action of mind; but it cannot prove that the mind which produced this order and harmony is unable to introduce a different one.

arn the presence of mind, not from material nature, but by the application of our own reason to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. This is overlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly true that as a mere matter of phenomenal appearance, we do not actually beh

er denies that from natural phenomena we can infer the existence of mind. But we also observe in natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable structures, that the results effected are produced, not by simple forces, but by the careful adjustment of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying the action of another, and by forces intersecting one another at precisely the right time and place. Had any of these oc

ested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make no distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly infers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this universe and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which is

bility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either in nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature, man's reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that, independently of man's moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its forces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to go to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to

theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He refers to them [pg 108] in the following words: "Here I cannot do better than avail myself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in

siderable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been carefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who gives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious pri

ral attributes are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other attributes. It is affirmed that because they [pg 109] are the attributes of an infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human thought. Consequently, holiness in

they were true. E.g. God is revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel's premises with respect to

loses all its value, if God is not what I mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I know not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength," becomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created by the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose claims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire of devotion to Him [pg 111] to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him? How shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how shall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or holiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of

hould be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which the human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of metaphysics which an imperfect measuring-line cannot reach. But placing the matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to Mr. Mill f

, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of Him can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from discussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in a concrete form. It is i

ion; and that therefore our reason is unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is incompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we

us something that has not come within the limits of our knowledge, but which something is of a similar character to the known? It will be at once seen that the determination of these questions is at the root of the whole controversy. If then by the infinite we mean something known plus something unknown, to speak of God as unknowable and unthinkable is absurd. Our knowledge of Him may not be full, but yet r

e greatest number I can conceive, plus all possible number without limit." Does my adding on the latter factor invalidate the reality of my conception of the former? Is that which is added on anything else than number? Surely here I have a valid conception. The same is true when we speak of the infinity of space. I mean by it the greatest space I can conceive, plus space without lim

if accuracy of thought is to be preserved, a distinction must be made. Some attributes of God may be viewed as quantitative; others cannot. It is to the form

m to create the universe, and that He is capable of exerting every other degree of power which is possible. We may call this, if we like, power without limit;

nal thought? Is the idea of a being who possesses power sufficient to build the universe, and all possible power besides, unthinkable? Again, we speak of God as infinitely wise. What do we mean by it? We affirm that

inite Being, there can be no being beyond Him. He must therefore include all being, both actual and possible. If this be so, He must also include the finite, otherwise there would be a being which is not inclu

ons of which quantity can legitimately be predicated. Of material being we can affirm that it is quantitative, but of no other

ect; but it cannot be measured by number or by line. These conceptions can only mean what we mean [pg 116] by them, and nothing else, even when applied to God, or we are attempting to pass off forged notes for genuine ones. The only possible additional idea which we introduce when thus ascribing them to God, is that in Him they are perfect, free from the imperfections with which they exist in us. To affirm that when we say that God is perfectly benevolent, or perfec

erefore may produce results different in character from the corresponding principles in man, because they are the attributes of an infinite being. I have alrea

maybe real. If we were to affirm that we only know that which we [pg 117] know perfectly, or were unable to reason on imperfect knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a standstill. Nor is it right to affirm that we are only reasoning in a circle when we reason from His moral attributes as displayed in the government of the world in favour of the probability of a revelation; or i

independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can only be a cause by its being in relation to t

r as the views in question bear adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is not fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of Christi

mption of the personality of God is the foundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the occurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would ha

tion which necessarily involves the finite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It fol

lasses of animals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally valid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite beings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in the first Cause of all things is inconceiv

e beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could reason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the existence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the assumption of

nd is derived from them, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property belonging to any other than human being

s to say, that although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being who had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the possession of all possible power, [pg 120] the conception

er to affirm "I" of one's own being-the possession of will-the power of self-consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions we undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but there is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If the conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is so constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is possi

the power adequate to build the universe, and all possible power beside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which it is impossible to predicate the possession of will or self-consciousness. When we affirm that such a being exists now, that he has existed in all past known times, and that no limits in point of time are conceivable of him, there is nothing contradictory in ascrib

g in a circle, as though he first assumed the existence of a personal God, and then derived the idea of his existence from revelation. This charge would undoubtedly be true if the idea of God being a person is unthinkable. I am at a loss to conceive how it becomes one atom more thinkable if communicated by a revelation. Much obscurity has undoubtedly been thrown on this subject by Christian writers who

is much which is unknown. This unknown is called unthinkable. But it is not unthinkable. It has only not yet become the subject of our knowledge, and is no more unthinkable than any other unknown truth. Or that may be pronounced to be unthinkable respecting which our conceptions are wanting in definiteness and precision. But to designate such things as unthinkable is an abuse of language. Or that may be designated as unthinkable of which our conceptions fail fully to represent the reality. As far as they go, they may be true, but there may be something beyond of a similar kind, which they do not embrace. This is the only sense in which it can be affirme

a revelation of Him is impossible, and if a revelation of Him is impossible, all

g