The Supernatural in the New Testament

ith it have been employed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of revelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words "nature," "natural", "law," "force," "sup

scientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay down strictly accurate definitions of all the terms used in the controversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is h

d invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the expression "laws of nature," and to speak of miracles as involving contradictions, violations, and suspensions of th

t meaning. Are we in fact under the expression "nature" to include both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is nature to include all things which exist, including their causes; laws, and forces; or is it to be

f nature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces, or do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and on whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy about miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the order of nature? Is it its material order; or does it includ

" "superhuman," or events occurring out of the order of nature? It is evident that whether

efinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they cannot accur

t the latter term is satisfied by attaching to it the meaning "usual." Nature then would mean the ordinary course o

d embrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is necessary; and into the conception of which neither volition nor freedom enters. If "nature" and "natural" had been used only in this sense,

e implies that the whole of our mental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to this, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word "natural" as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The question

matter, under a common term, leads to the inference that there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the outset a petitio principii of the entire question under definition. I shall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the number of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the question about the possibility and the credi

must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must be used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and laws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular manner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual I am not

o both alike, as being simple manifestations of the same original force. To this it will be sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, [pg 031] and never has been nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all our certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that we live u

iginated, it is a simple fact that it exists in the universe, and that its phenomena belong to an order of its own. It is no mere theory, but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying the action of the forces of the material universe, bu

in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not confound the distinct phenomena of mind and matter under a common designation. Both together compose the universe; but each belongs to a different order of pheno

t stands excluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of miracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption of the existence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while theism affirms that God and the universe, whe

henomena under the designation of the "laws of nature." It is absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Duke of Argyll tells us in

applied simply to an ob

g the action of some force or forces

s, the measure of whose operation has be

ions of forces which have reference to the fulfi

a, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, necessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this

Duke, "all circle round the three great questions which

cts in their est

me to be? What relation do they bear to purpose, to the

resemble that of persons who are compelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an occurrence is natural or supernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a violation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which enter into this controversy m

for human conduct and nothing more. Such rules of conduct for the most part pre-suppose that they are imposed by some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce obedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward feeling that it is right to do so, and knows that his conscience will r

ssess the power to act or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer it, of taking the consequences of diso

them. But as the consideration of will or purpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly excluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the invariable order of sequences, and not to include [pg 035] the f

to enforce them. The whole question of intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province. Law, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of a set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents.

whatever force they may ultimately be resolved into, can effect much. They are in fact the antecedents of which the invariable order of events are the consequents. Respecting the ultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, or how it is

miracles are impossible, than to import into the term law the idea of force, or efficient causation, even at the very time when the presence of intelligent action is denied. It is this which imparts to this class of reasonings their entire speciousness. The laws of material nature are contin

agents. We hear of creation by law, evolution by law, of results brought about by the action of invariable laws, and a countless number of assertions of a similar description. To such expressions in a popular sense when no accuracy of expression is required, there is no objection; but when they are introduced into the controversy respecting the credibility of miracles, they create nothing but confusion. What is really meant is,

tand out in the strongest contrast with the forces which act upon material things, and with the laws of their action. Nothing can be more entirely different in character than the force of gravitation and the principles of volition and self-consciousness, or than the unconscious forces of material nature and those principles which constitute our rationality. If we affirm that the forces of mind act in conformity with law, it ought to be clearly understood that they act in conformity with a law of their own, which affords free act

hich bear a different phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained to be capable of transmutation into one another. But it must never be forgotten that it is able to affirm nothing respecting the source in which the forces of the universe originate. All that it can affirm is, that they do exist. The original conception of force is one, however, which we derive, not from the material universe, but from the action of our own minds. We a

held about their origin. It is absurd to confound principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or electricity, with those which produce the most disinterested moral actions, and designate them by the [pg 039] common term "natural forces." In common language we are in no danger of error when we speak of the force of conscience,

ction between miracles and supernatural occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles supernatural occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? The determination of this question is closely connected with

e mean when we call an occurrence a miracle ought to be made sufficiently clear and distinct. In this controversy it would greatly tend to precision if we used the term "miracle" as distinguished from an occurrence which is supernatural or

ake place at the bidding of the agent. Such previous announcement, or prediction, is necessary to render even a supernatural occurrence in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some occurrence in physical nature previously unknown may therefore convert such an event into an evidential miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere objective fact may have been brought about by some known or unknown forces of material nature. To render it such it would be necessary that the knowledge of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds of existing knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the science of astronomy was utterly unknown, had announced beforehand the day and the hour of the occurrence of the next two transits of Venus, and the various places on the earth's surface in

ion of known forces, or to the calling of unknown forces into activity, or to the immediate agency of the divine mind. It is clear therefore that their occurrence as objective facts proves the presence of

which is preceded by an announcement on the part of the agent that it is about to happen or takes place directly on his bidding. The latter element, as I have observed, is essential to constitute the occurrence an evidential miracle. Otherwise in our ignorance of what unknow

governing power of the universe, i.e. God; but that if supernatural agents exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; and con

uage therefore, it is impossible to be certain whether an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural, until we are acquainted with the possible action of every force that exists in the universe. This difficulty, however, is one that is entirely theoretical, and has not the smallest practical importance with respect to the miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several thousand years' experience of what can be effected by the ordinary forces of material nature. Occurrences which lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the presence of intelligence and volition. The introduc

urrences, if they took place precisely as they are recorded. We know enough of the ordinary forces of material nature to be certain that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man by a word does not lie within the sphere of their opera

it would only prove the presence and intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the unintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I have observed, is to prove the supernatural nature of [pg 044] the occurrence. But although, if it was certainly supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a supernatura

idential miracles is simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class of supernatural occurrences mentioned in the New Testament seem to have been wrought, not for purposes directly evidential, but to awaken attention; and another class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, to render it possible to lay deep in human society the foundations of the Church as a visible and permanent institution. S

tions which those who undertake to prove the credibility of miracles ought never to concede. The plain fact is, that we are simply ignorant of the mode in which God acts on material nature; and every definition must be faulty which assumes that we have that knowledge. To say that miracles must involve even a suspension of the laws of nature introduces a needless difficulty. No law or force

orded in the New Testament we cannot affirm the use of such media, although we observe an economy in the use of divine power: i.e. no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to produce the particular result in question. But i

of law, and leads to confusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable sequences between phenomena, are neither forces nor powers. The counteraction of one force by another is an event of daily occurrence. All th

ts for a long, yet definite period of time; then by the operation of the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; and afterwards that it might revert to the original one; and that this operation might be continued for ever. If therefore the great Author of nature had so planned the machine

p. Could any miracle-working mill be even conceived of, which could bring out, as part of the normal law of its operations, the cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by a word, or effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension into Heaven? Such occurrences could not be produced by the action of any machine which has the smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further: such an operation would be impotent to answer the purposes of a miracle, unless the particular result was announced beforehand by one who was completely ignorant that the machine was capable of producing such extraordinary results. This ignor

ly be determined by the exercise of our reason. It has been objected that the agency which [pg 048] produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that is, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: but this

rms habitually used in this controversy, and which greatly modify their meaning. These however will best

g