The Caillaux Drama

rench and English papers both, "is too fresh in the reader's mind for any exhaustive reference to it here to be necessary." But memories are short in th

Caillaux made mistake on mistake, and was misled by his hatred of the Ministers who had been instrumental in the origin

ions. Further imprudence was shown by his endeavour to palliate the effect of his first ill-considered act, and he was finally forced to con

ct of Algeciras. It will be remembered that the Act of Algeciras gave France the right of policing Morocco because of its neighbourhood to Algiers. Three years after the Act of Algeciras

n the basis of the act of Algeciras [Pg 152] between France and Germany might lead to a weakening

tenance of order, and promised collaboration economically. A secret letter changed hands, confirming this agreement, and admitting that Germany should remain disinterested in the politics of Morocco. In this same letter it was admitted also that the e

had been in the French Foreign Office, paid a visit to Berlin, and the result of his negotiations with the German Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstrasse was a memorandum dated June 2, 1909, by which it was decided to create a Franco-German Company for the p

Minister and retained Monsieur Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay, but Monsieur Clemenceau

tle upheaval in French internal politics, and it was at this point that Monsieur Ca

a substantial indemnity, a portion of the territory for which it held concessions. A commission was formed to discuss terms, but i

apital of F2,000,000, fifty per cent. of which was in French hands, twenty-six per cent. in German hands, and the remaining twenty-four per cent. in the hands of the other Powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras. Then parliamentary politics in France ha

r about the 15th of the month the Imperial Government had, to all practical intent, agreed to allow, to a Franco-German company, concessions in the German Cameroons. A fortnight after that, on February 28, 1911, Monsieur Briand and his Cabinet were forced to resign. On March 3, Monsieur Monis became Prime Minister of France, and Monsieur Caillaux was his Minister of Finance. The Monis Cabinet found itself weighted [Pg 156] with immense responsibility. The situation in Morocco was extremely difficult, and the French Government found itself on

l grievance by the military steps which had to be taken, and the Pan-Germanists of course jumped at the pretext for accusing France of laying forcible hands, or attempt

den breaking off of all negotiations and apparent disregard on the part of France for everything which had smoothed over the situation before. The fact that the change of policy had become a necessity owing to Cabinet changes in France and the promises made by members of the new Cabinet to their constituents could not be offered as a reason. At the best they could be offere

ve been against the measure and to have expressed his views as forcibly as the French Constitution allowed him to express them, and Monsieur Conty, the director of political affairs in the French Foreign Office, was distinctly adverse to the measure as well. Monsieur Co

ned the French Government that there was grave danger to peace in ignoring their claims. He pointed out that while the [Pg 159] Kaiser was known to be pacific and conciliatory at the time, he might be forced by the Pan-German and co

ure of the Franco-German partnership in Cameroon and the Congo had diplomatic consequences." Unfortunately at this time (March 1911) the principal pre-o

nd's policy mounted in diamonds and wear it as a [Pg 160] scarfpin," Monsieur Caillaux is reported to have said. The epigram, whether he made it or not-and I believe that he did make it-expresses very neatly-far too neatly-the

French Government learned of serious trouble in Morocco. Several tribes were rising, and military intervention became inevitable. German irritation was growing. The German object, or at all events one of Germany's main objects, in the discussions and negotiations which began [Pg 161] in 1909 and broke off so suddenly and so dangerously in 1911 had been to ensure a German share in the public works whi

cially so that the promised interests of the German shareholders should be properly protected. The French Government refused. Such interv

ence and wearisome delays, and presently the question of the railways complicated it still further. In the secret letter of 1909 it had been stipulated that the directors of the Moroccan railways should be French. The German Government now claimed that this clause should be taken to mean that only the director

ing men considerable grounds for uneasiness. It was felt that a very thinly veiled antagonism on all questions of detail was making itself very apparent at the Wilhelmstrasse. There was no

fpin." If Monsieur Cruppi and his colleagues had been able to approve the convention with Germany for N'Goko Sanga and the Congo which Monsieur Pichon had prepared, there would have been no excuse for the remark which was

o-operate with the Sultan in the chastisement of rebel bands. On April 17 (President Fallières had left [Pg 164] for Tunis on the 15th), the French Government placed 2400 men

silence the communication made by the French Ambassador in Berlin, Monsieur Jules Cambon, that it had been necessary to send French troops to Fez to protect French subje

ne across French [Pg 165] territory. This hope disappeared however, and in May 1911 the Agadir coup was decided on. Germany realized that the only way of obtaining "compensation" was a threat. The Panther went to Agadir. The French Ambassador had a conversation with the German Secretary of State at Kissingen. The German Press was ho

nally, at first at all events, when the Panther and the Berlin went to Agadir. Monsieur de Selves, the French Foreign Minister, left Paris for Holland on July 3. On July 4, [Pg 166] Monsieur Caillaux, who as Prime Minister took over the Foreign Office while Monsieur de Selves was away, instructed Mons

We must therefore ask the German Government first of all to explain the object of this conversation. According to the reply of the German Government it will be time, after it has been made, for us to decide whether we should m

ed. The Russian Government remained passive. Germany realized that her bluff would not be called. On July 7 Monsieur de Selves returned from Holland, and Herr von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Pa

ow the lines of the 1909 understanding might be possible. Monsieur de Selves immediately asked, through Monsieur Jules Cambon, for a written note explaining and setting forth this suggestion. It was not till July 15 that the French [Pg 168] Govern

learn by other means what is going on at Agadir, public o

iation. He added that the safety of Great Britain's commerce overseas was no question of party, and that the national honour was at stake. England to a man showed that it was prepared to back France aga

refusal to submit, or the acceptance in principle of a rectification of the Congo-Cameroon frontier and the granting to France of sufficient authority to cope with the thr

ons were. According to Monsieur Caillaux the first mention of the Belgian Congo was made by Monsieur von Lancken, but there seems to be every reason to believe that Monsieur Caillaux lost his head a little and introduced the [Pg 170] question himself. If this be so Monsieur Caillaux committed a grave fault in tactics, and it appears certain that the German Government considered Monsieur Caillaux an easier person to deal with in these matters than his Foreign

28, the German Government was convinced that Monsieur Caillaux was ready to treat. On that date, when Monsieur Jules Cambon asked the German Foreign Minister whether Germany were not ready to find some

ims on the Congo in such a way as not to justify British alarm, and to offer with one hand what it withdrew with the other, in Morocco. These negotiations lasted fully three m

legram was sent and received, that Monsieur de Selves obtained possession of it, and that Monsieur Calmette would have published it in the Figaro in the course of his campaign against Monsieur Caillaux if he had not been induced to refrain from so doing on patriotic grounds. Several people have seen and read this telegram. After the death of Gaston Calmette it was found in his pocket book with a bullet-hole through it, and handed over, by the brothers of the dead man, to Monsieur Raymond Poincaré in person, for sa

aux's interference with the negotiations between the French and German Foreign Offices should take place in the presence of the President of the Republic. Monsieur Caillaux, in a fury of indignation, declared to Monsieur Fallières that there was no truth in the insinuation contained in the message, and went straight

eaty was discussed for a full week in the Chamber, and accepted on November 21. During this week's debate Monsieur Caillaux was attacked with some vivacity, and Monsieur de Selves' attitude gave cause for much excitement. On January 9, 1912, the Senate sitting in committee discussed the Franco-German treaty. In the course of this discussion Monsieur Caillaux, the Prime Minister, explained the conditions under which the negotiations for Fran

n Affairs," said Monsieur Clemenceau, "state whether documents are in existence showing that our Ambassador in B

eur Caillaux, who had sat down, jumped up again, but Monsieur Clemenceau prevented him from speaking. "I am not addressi

s. I ask the permission of the commission to remain silent and to give no answer to the question [Pg 176] Monsieur Clemenceau has just asked." "Your reply," said Monsieur Clemenceau, "may be perfectly satisfactory to my colleagues, bu

f Monsieur Caillaux, the Prime Minister, that there had been no negotiations carried on without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to be in flagrant contradiction with Monsieur de Selves' reticence, an

honour to ask you to accept my resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs. It would be impossible for me to undertake any longer the responsibility of a foreign policy for which unity of views and unity of action are withheld from me in the Cabinet. My anxiety to obtain a satisfactory result in official negotiations of difficulty and to obtain the approval of Parliament on my efforts has been responsible for my remaining

Caillaux to which I have already referred. The President of the Republic accepted the resignation of Monsieur d

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