Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge

hat it presents well-marked stages and can best be described by reference to these. Frequently, moreover, the m

nd the faculty of making such representations appears to be a condition precedent to the development of deliberation, volition, and purposive action as opposed to reflex or instinctive acti

propriate expression in speech. Discourse is an instrument by means of which man has been enabled to construct his whole system of representations of the world in which he lives, the system of what is commonly called his Knowledge. Human Knowledge just is the body of man's representations of his Experience in the world of which he forms a part. It is not necessary to insist here on the grad

ame in time to attempt to give an account not only of the immediate objects which surround him, but

ual activity of the Greek mind, we find it engaged in the construction of var

evailed in the Greek communities; several men of conspicuous genius-notably Heracleitus and Parmenides-had carried speculation as to the origin and nature of the world to a height

furnished. γν?θι σεαυτ?ν was his motto. All explanations of the Universe or of Experience were, as he showed, vain unless the Cognitive Faculty by which they were constructed were operating truly. In particular, the process of Rational Discourse implied the use of con

al Discourse as essential to its formation. They quite understood that Knowledge is not of the nature of a photograph-a resemblant pictorial reproduction of the data furnished by sensation. Only very casu

hat it is something which can be communicated to, and which is the common possession of, several individuals. That can never be true of sensation. We can never tell whether our sensations are the same as those of other people-neve

was one of the great results of the Socratic discussion. This explains the immense imp

mes of ideas (ε?δη) with which the mind is naturally furnished, and further that these ideas corresponded to and typified the eternal forms of things-the essential constituen

. 478-79) midway between Knowledge and nescience to which he applied the term δ?ξα, frequently translated opinion, but which in this connection would be much more accurately rendered, sensible impression, or even perception. At any rate, the term opinion is a

ed the fluent instability of the sensible impression, and as we have already pointed out, sensation in itself labours also under this drawback

fect, Plato offered the ideas-universal forms common to the intelligence of every rational being. Not only would they render possible a common Knowledge of Reality-the existence of such ideas would

e generally distinguished between the two by the employment of distinct terms, applying ε?δο? to the mental conception and ?δ?α to the substantial form. This verbal distinction was accepted by many scholars of the epoch of Liddell and Scott and Davies and Vaughan. A reference to this distinction in the present writer's essay on The Dynamic Foundation of Knowledge provoked at the instance of one critic the allegation that it is not borne out by a critic

nterparts of the substantial forms of Reality. This, according to him, was a wholly unnecessary reduplication. He was content to believe that the mind found and recognised the essential forms of things wh

ypes were necessarily impotential. There was no generative power in the pure activity of Thought. If, therefore, the essentials of Reality were ideal, it followed that they als

conception which failed to provide for this process of causative generation of the things of Sense could in h

ifficulty which the Platonic doctrine was designed to meet-that, namely, of providing some sort of common nexus or unifying principle by which th

sought the essentials of Reality not in the Mind but in the Object. It may be fairly claimed that to this extent he occupied

tellectu quod n

inds in the constitution of the Mind the eternal principles or at least the types of the eternal principles of Reality; the Aristotelian, he for whom these seem to

Greek Philosophy soon after Aristotle's death decayed or was deprived of its early vigour, and the doc

tion-a speculation of which much is now forgotten and almost as much was certainly barren and unfruitful, but of which we

rived from the cognitive faculty itself. Our cognition of our immediate surroundings was doubtless continuously corrected by immediate practical tests. But the science of a

ed or supposed to be derived from the necessities of our Reason, and by the ai

e was in its

faculty could discover to us only t

ception of the nature of Knowledge they would never have imagined that any necessity of Thought obliged them to believe that a 10 lb. weight would fall to the ground more rapidly th

concerned, the Mind was regarded as a tabula rasa, and the physician set himself to ascertain the laws of nature not by reflection upon his own mental processes or requirements, but

compris la synthèse scolastique du moyen age, elle qui cependant a concilié d'une fa?on admirable l'actuel et le potentiel dans l'explication de la nature des choses. Il

iew which this critic seeks to qualify, but which we still think in the main sound, we are at the same time very glad to be able in this way to invite attention to the undoubted fact that the distinction between the actual and the potential was recognised by the schoo

understand accurately what

ed by Aristotle when he formulated the theory of an Energy ever generative of the sensible. If the founders of Science did not fully grasp the Aristotelian conception, it is at least certain that they looked upon Nature not merely as a sensible presentation but as a process-a dynamic operation. It was to the study

to the mere study of sensations-of blue things and green things, of hard things and soft things, of loud

y along it, leaving the Schoolmen and Philosoph

xtended itself to Metaphysics, and under the leadership of Descartes

ouched his famous Cogito, ergo sum. The simple fact or act of Doubt implied the Activity-the Reality therefore-of the Doubter. But the cogitant subject was reduced very much to the condition of a tabula rasa, and when Descartes pro

elements of Knowledge were described by him as the primary qualities of body; the sensible presentation compri

amined in detail, his sensible ideas are seen to be not mere qualifications of sensation, but rather the elementary characters of Nature viewed as a dynamic process and discovered

Hume. Experience with them appeared to consist solely of a succession of sen

. Berkeley, it is true, endeavoured to save the situation by postulating the incessant and immediate intervention of the Deity as the sustainer of the sensible panorama. This purely arbitrary and fictitiou

ently existent substratum by which that Experience is sustained and organised. His argument, though it attracted considerable attention, did not, however, affect as deeply as might have been expected the future of philosophic speculation, probably because he offered

elements, the fundamentals of Science, in the constitution of the cognitive faculty itself. But very differently from Plato he discovered these in the categories or essential forms of intellective action,-the cate

art of the speculative world as the most hopeful and progressive of philosophic efforts, and by its own votaries as placing them in a position of superiority to all

unnecessary even to cr

ad no prospect of succeeding where Plato-equipped

ence came these sensations which, however transitory and unreal, constantly saluted our consciousness and largely const

t there was a World outside of the individual consciousness, by the categories of which, according to them, our cognitions of such a World were called into being. For if Reality were unknowable except by

auer, who also appears to have realised that what was wanted

alidity must come from somewhere beyond the cognitive faculty itself. The source upon which men again and again have seemed to fall back is Sensation; but Sensation being transitory and dependent for i

fails to show how the sensible arises. It is supposed to be generated out of pure Volition, but no causal nexus, no direct connection of any kind is immediately apparent between th

pressure of the dilemma and to solace mankind for the failure of Kantianism by advising them to accept Experience as it is. But though

is cognitive faculty his speculation has followed one or other of two great lines or d

from the constitution of the cognitive faculty itself. To this theory, which has inspired one wh

e appears to stand in a direct and even unique relation to the real. It fails to let us understan

ld, how we can get beyond ourselves, how if the Mind in its search for truth is perpetually i

e found in the Object and are thence supplied to the Understanding,

on that Nature must be regarded as an energetic process containing wi

gnised even by the leaders of scientific discovery, this was the conception of Nature which inspired and sustained the scientific advance. In the department of philosophic speculation, however, it appeared only under the debased and misleading form of a belief that the sensible presentation was the true source of the contents

am of impressions, no sort of rational Discourse, no scientific or cognitive effort could ever have been stimulated into activity, and the ver

e can we arrive at any consistent or intelligible con

e any progress we must find another and a new key whereby to unlock

ll these various efforts after a solution is to be found in the fact tha

to and fro, but which itself-the fundamental thing-is solid and unchanging. But this is an illusio

cess of transmutation in which cohesion consists. The sun shines eternally st

vity. That was recognised as long ago as the days of Heracleitus, but his disciples did not-although we think there is good ground for believing that he did[60:1]-his disciples did not

of natural action. Such are the law of gravitation, the laws of optics or of chemical com

e, and must in some way or other reproduce the activity of Nature. Thought, in short, is an Acti

he conception of potency at all? We reply that we arrive at the idea of potent action because we are ourselves active beings. Our organism

ural bodies in vision blinds us to the fact that we are really not merely surrounded by but are mingled with and participate in the dynamic system.[61:1] We are continually pressing with our weight upon the bodies on which we rest, we are continually exerting or resisting the pressure of so-called

bles us to proceed at once to a

as you like to take of the myriad constituents of our sensible Exper

not a real thing, hence the unreal character of Sensation. Yet the obstruction being an obstruction of the real action of Nature is, if not real, at l

ich have dominated speculation pres

s right. That cognisable element is Action. But Action is denoted for us only in the obstructions which it encounters. These obstructions constitute our Worl

. It is by and through its obstructions and these only that we featurise or denote our Experience. It is by the breaks, the turnings in the road that we cognise

ence is relational, not resemblant. Just so, it is by the reflection of Light that we discover the forms of the obstacle which solid bodies oppose to the radiant undulation. The resultant colours c

ollow the progress of the battle, but the bat

itude averted from the aperture, and it is only by the shadows cast upon the cave

t is actual; and it affords us the materials from which we construct our scheme o

dence? How even on this view of the case do we manage to get beyond ourselves? How are we in an

laws of energetic transmutation in which we partake and of which we are organically a part, however apparently separate and disparate our bodies may seem to be. It is life and feeling, not action, which really distinguish the individual from his environment, at least from his material dynamic environment. Be it noted that what is required is not an explanation o

stinct from the dynamic system. We cannot, in fact, shake off the bonds of co

e stresses of the dynamic environment; hence the apparent freedom and inde

stracted, is nothing more than a permanent process of energy transmutation the interruption of which in one form or another may originate Sensation. It follows that the world of spatially extended bodies is a homogeneous and consistent whole, reflec

nd certain indicators of the potent obstructions which our activity encounters. For this reason we habitually make use of the visual sign as the guide and instrument of our exertional activity, and this habitual use leads u

experiences of the blind and of those to whom vision has been restored are not very numerous, but many of these recorded by Plai

author, M. Pierre Villey, is himself blind. In the interests of Science he has cast aside the delicacy and reserve which have generally prevented the blind from analysing or at least from discussing the imp

and understand spatial and geometrical problems. The sensible furniture by which the spatial conceptions of the blind are denoted obviously cannot be visual, and are no doubt largely tactual, whilst on the other hand the vident utilise the visual data to the almost total exclusion of any other. There must therefore be some common measure by means of which a community is established between the spatial conceptions of the blind and those of the vident. M. Villey concludes and clearly shows that

a notable confirmation from the establishment during the latter part

formation. The objective correlatives of the different classes of sensible experiences are found to be different forms which this Energy assumes-the kinetic energy of a mass in motion, the radiant energy of Light, the energy of Heat, the potential energy of chemical separation, etc.-all these have now at length been shown to be forms of one real thing capable under a

nerating the phenomenal World, has again been revived and realised-but with great additions. The theory in the hands of Science is n

tual have, so to say, been laid bare to view; and lastly, the inter-transm

human knowledge has received new strength. The theory is still, nevertheless, not to be grasped without a resolute effort of reflection. It involves an inversion of our everyday conceptions more radical than that which was demanded by the Copernican theory o

that when the first strangeness of the new position has disappeared the conditions may be accepted with greater readiness. At any rate, a correct apprehension of our fundamental conceptions of the world of our external experience is indispen

osed and that state of consciousness which I call my Will [imagine anyone calling Will a state of consciousness!] are co

ons could proceed and in terms of which, as a point of origin, their statement of transmutations was made. The persistence of material bodies is a condition precedent to the phenomenal manifestations in which our Experience arises. Organic existence in every form and the world in which it arises presuppose the actuality of these. But dynamically they are merely the phenomenal result of certain permanent forces constantly in operation. To beings, if there

have been found to favour the extraordinary view that our mathematical conceptions are derived from Sensation. We do not propose here to discuss at length this idea. It is merely another form of the old sensationalist view of Knowledge, but we suggest that the conditions of the

etrical proposition-such, for example, as the assertion that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles-is not merely approximate. It has no dependence on measurement. It is absolutely true. It is ascertained deductively, and therefore measurement is not involved, and is never employed. Its truth is not ascertained

For such, a different geometry may and will be applicable; but for the tridimensional conditions of our activity the proposition is necessary and absolute. No measurement of any stella

elling. Occasionally we find persons urging that all spelling should be an exact reproduction of sound.

ain fixed frames and to deviate more and more from pure phonetic simplicity. But why is this so? It is because the sounds are merely the symbols or indicators of the different forms of vocal articulation (vocal acts), and it is really as the symbols and indicators of these acti

in spelling is a microcosmic counterpart of the p

ing necessarily happens in the ca

tic spelling have been also the autho

d contractions, and this proceeds in accordance with a principle unconsciously recognised but which really depends on the same inherent necessity to preserve in a consistent form the expression of the radical vocables of Speech. Finally, in the hands of the expert stenographer the system of phonetic shorthand (thoug

s the general question of Spelling Reform, which of course is quite apart from the attempt to establish a scheme of spel

e innumerable "isms" by which it seeks ever and anon to keep itself afloat are most of them but the sometimes unrecognisable wreckage of the old systems drifting about under very inappropriate names. S

linging pathetically to the insecure relics of teleological doctrine, or, still less virile, seekin

preach an unrelieved pessimism, let us remind such that Knowledge is not after all the source of Life, that another category and a different principle-that, namely, which we indicate under the term Love-divine-m

truth. They very nearly failed to assimilate the Copernican cosmogony. For sixteen hundred years after it wa

for. If they fail, civilisation must disappear and humanity decline. There is no middle course. As

r conceptions, how largely it still dominates-or till recently di

of the difficulties of the age-old problem. They wander wearily through the mazes of psychological detail or wage almost childish logomachies over the interpretation of each other's essays. Philosophical magazines are filled with articles which reflec

ilosopher, and words shaped and polished by long usage generally express, more truly than those who use them realise, the essential reality of th

sly contrasted distinction. It might be better if Action and Active could be applied generally to both and if the term exertion could be substituted for Action in describing the forms of activity which we denominate motor. To that suggestion, however,

ain briefly what we conceive to be the true solution. The argument in support of the doctrine here explained has been more fully presented by the prese

TNO

? κα? ?στι κα? ?σται π?ρ ?ε?ζωον ?πτ?μενον μ?τρα κα? ?ποσβενν?μενον μ?τρα. Quoted by C

n corps isolés est relative à notre pe

der may be referred to a little work by Sir William Ra