History of the World War, Vol. 3

n of war, it had embarked upon a policy of naval up-building that brought it into direct conflict with England's sea policy. Thereafter it became a ra

with ideal weather conditions favoring the low visibility tactics of the German sea command, a victory for the Teutonic ships would follow. It was this belief that

rom the direction of Helgoland Bight. Fifteen minutes later the smoke plumes were in such number and volume that the advance of a considerable force to the northward and eastward was indicated. It was reasoned by Vice-Admiral Beatty, to whom the Galatea had sent the news by r

ss, that was issued upon semiofficial aut

ary, Tiger, Inflexible, Indomitable, Invincible, Indefatigable, and New Zealand, were on a southeasterly c

German battle cruiser squadron, consisting of the new cruiser Hindenbu

s (nine miles) as the fleets closed. The Germans could see the British distinctly outlined against the lig

as they came within range. The German battle cruiser

cruisers. The whole German High Seas Fleet could be seen approaching on the northe

ht around 16 points and took station in f

hips, therefore, had before him the whole of the German

ships would have been cut off from Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. In order to avoid this and at the same time prepare the way so that Jellicoe might envelop his ad

ermans and take up a tactical position in advance of their line. He was a

nd the Queen Mary and the Invincible also were lost at the turning p

zabeths had in similar manner concentrated their fire on the turning point

ree ships, racing parallel to the German battle cruisers. The

in order to follow Beatty. The Warspite jammed her steering gear, failed t

tedly straddled by shell fire with the water boiling up all around her, she was not seriously hit, and was able to s

anger spot where the Queen Mary and the Invincible had been lost, and for an hou

rrections of their opponents that no hits of a seriously disabling character were suffered. They had the speed over their opponents

range which varied between 12,000 and 15,000 yards, especially against those ships which we

left out of range, and the Queen Elizabeths w

flanking the German battle cruisers, which were, therefore, obli

er was sunk; but toward 6 o'clock the German fire slackened very considerably, showing that Beatty's

hree directions, the Queen Elizabeths altered their course four points to the s

difficult operation of deploying between the battle

followed by the damaged but still serviceable Queen Eliz

e Royal Oak with their fifteen-inch guns, and the Agincourt which

indeed, only decent light was necessary to complete their work of destroying the Germans in detail. The light did improve for a few minutes

e German ships, but the mist came down, visibility suddenly failed, and

nveloped between Jellicoe on the west, Beatty on the north, and Evan Thomas with h

ttacked the German ships, and, although they lost seri

VAL BATTLE OF JU

ral indication of the courses of the op

their searchlights the three Queen Elizabeths, not more than 4,000 yards away. Unfortunately they were then able to escap

ss. It was spoiled by the unfavorable weather conditions, especially at the critical moment, wh

ably supported by the ships of the fifth battle squadron under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought the action under, at times, dis

e cruiser seen to be so severely damaged that its return was extremely doubtful; five light cruisers, seen to sink-one of them possibly a battleship; six destroyers seen to sink, three destroyers so damaged that it was doubtful if they wo

heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action. The conduct of the officers and men war entirely beyond praise. On all sides it is reported that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld; whether in the heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers

ss than on May 31st, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet until 9 A.M. The British fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of a

uent events proved this assumption to have been correct. The British position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 A.M. the fleet engaged a Ze

retreated and nevermore ventured forth from beneath the protecting guns and mine fields around Helgoland, demonstrates beyond dispute tha

nsisting of three batt

large number of small

was cruising in the S

rlier occasions, of o

nguard of the small c

man time) suddenly en

cape on the northwes

newest cruisers of t

y of the most mo

forces and the first

ere following the Bri

rman battle cruisers s

battle squadron of six

two of the Indefati

attle line on a southe

his line ahead on the

ing fight. He opened

eavy artillery at a

enemy. The weather wa

ight with a n

of an hour a violent

the Indefatigable ty

and destroy

n the afternoon five

rom the west and join

lly reinforcing with

le cruisers remaining

iority Vice Admiral

the enemy. The Britis

, and a bitter enga

e of which a light c

orpedo boats, the crew

a heavy fire. Two Br

d two others-the Nest

pled condition. These

German torpedo boat

viv

was in progress, a m

e the Queen Mary, th

at 6.30

rman main battleship f

orth. The hostile fas

ing the first part of

t an

t high speed before t

he German battle cr

increasing intensity

ls of the Queen Eliza

tleship division parti

wed a desire to run i

our line an

the evening British

an attack against ou

s by manoeuvring, wh

om the engagement,

as far as can be e

econnoitring group, w

ceived an attack fro

soon put out of acti

llas immediately att

from the haze bank to

least twenty-five batt

the British battle cr

on a northwesterly to

easterly to sout

e British main fleet,

eight battleships each

uisers of the Invi

hree of the newest

with fifteen-inch gun

clock in the evening t

ng the combat betwe

etermined to attack t

ed was completely ass

n battleship squadr

rst toward the exten

e crippled cruiser

e. Around the Wiesbad

ly changing condit

, supported by an armo

tour, Achilles, and Du

theast, were encoun

of the decreasing vis

battleship division.

ire by which the smal

. The cruiser Warrior

Another small cruise

y had fallen victims

the leading British

yers were damaged. The

division had in these

enemy's battleship s

ld be made out in th

ally to the east, Germ

shelling of great i

g between 8.20 and 8.3

rman ships observed th

blew up under condit

nvincible sank after

class had earlier rece

abeth class was runni

aratus apparentl

at least fifteen heavy

e in line. Vice Admi

Moltke on a torpedo

meantime took the lead

otilla attacked the e

the action the Germa

seen in a sinking con

tor

nt onslaught into the

st sight of each other

t cessation in the a

d a new attack by all

rs, which with sever

eaded the line, encou

enewed the heavy fire

nd then by the leadin

s now flung themselves

the enemy line in or

. They approached th

om 6,000 meters dist

hed forward to attack

the most severe counte

tter artillery fire w

lent onslaught, by th

nn

llas, which were orde

enetrating the smoke

before them; nor, wh

erman squadrons upo

where the enemy was

. Only once more-s

le flare up. For a s

cruisers sighted four

re immediately. As th

e enemy turned and van

ruisers of the fourt

the older enemy armor

gh

ed the d

which, after losing si

outherly direction, w

t force in ra

ed by the general stra

arly dar

was injured severely d

nce group with a super

st fro

the Cressy class sudd

d was shot into fire a

four m

oyer 60, (the names w

efore were uncertainl

, and 27-were destro

two by the ram of a G

g the G-30, were hit

Tipperary and Turbule

behind in a sinking c

them burning at

s torpedoes were sight

(a battleship) fell a

Rostock was hit, bu

damaged by a German

After vain endeavors t

up, but only after he

torpedo boat was struc

em

D LOSSE

NNAGE P

attle cruiser

(battle crui

battle cruis

ored cruiser

ored cruiser

(armored crui

(destroyer

(destroyer

estroyer

k (destroy

destroye

destroyer

estroyer

destroye

ish

uisers 63

ruisers 4

yers 9

ships 114

LOSSES-

NNAGE P

le cruiser)

attleship)

(cruiser

(cruiser

cruiser)

cruiser)

troyers

an T

uisers 39

ruisers 1

yers 5

hips 63,

no one outside of Germany doubted but that their losses w

WILLIA

United States Naval Fo

SIR DAVI

ief of the Brit

LOSSES

IT

missin

nde

al

RM

missin

nde

al

Y VALUE (Rou

h $115

n 63,

$178,0

Hampshire. The entire crew was also lost, except twelve men, a warrant officer and eleven seamen, who escaped on a raft. Earl Kitchener was on his way to Russia, at the request of the Russian Government, for a consultation regarding munitions to be furnished the Russian army. He was intending to go

that it struck a mine, but the tragedy very naturally brought into exis

d on to the quarter deck. There I saw him walking quite collectedly, talking to two of the officers. All three were wearing khaki and had no overcoats on. Kitchener calmly watched the preparations for abandoning the ship, which were going on in a steady and orderly way. The crew just went to their stations, obeyed orders, and did their best to get out the boats. But it was impossible. Owing to the rough weather, no boats could be lowered. Those that were got out were smashed up at once. No boats left the ship. What people on the shore thought to be boats leaving, were

Kitchener M

e out a statement declaring that the vessel str

of the South African campaign; the reorganizer of Egypt. In his work as Secretary of War he had met with some criticism, but he possessed, more than any other man, the public confidence. At the beginning of the war he was appointed Secretary of War at the demand of an overwhelming public opinion. He realized more than any one else what such a war would mean. When others thought of it as an ad