Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War

g and illuminating, concerning the utility of the Fourth Arm as a military unit were advanced. The general consensus of expert opinion w

ed are rather moral than material in their effects. Here and there startling successes have been recorded especially upon the British

scouts. In fact in the very earliest days of the war, the British airships, though small and slow in movement, proved more serviceable for this duty than their dynamic consorts. This result was probably due to the fact that military strategy and tactics were somewhat nonplussed by

g to the exigencies of the moment. At all events, the protagonists were somewhat loth to utilise the dirigible upon an elaborate scale or in an aggressive manner. It was employed more after the fashion of a captive balloon, being sent aloft from a point well behind the front lines

e hostile lines were carried out. But even here a certain hesitancy became manifest. This was perfectly excusable, for the simple reason that the dirigible, above all, is a fair-weather c

ationary in the air, the propellers revolving at just sufficient speed to off-set the wind and tendencies to drift. In other words,

ain its dynamic equilibrium, and this speed is often too high to enable the airman to complete his reconnaissance with sufficient accuracy to be of valu

ther, obstructs the observer's vision. The caprices of this obstacle are extraordinary, as anyone who has indulged in ballooning knows fully well. On a clear summer's day I have been able to see the ground beneath with perfect distinctness from a height of 4,500 feet, yet when the craft had ascended a further two or three hundred feet, the panorama was blurred. A film of haze lies between the balloon and the ground

, who have accompanied the Zeppelins and Parsevals on numerous aerial journeys under varying conditions of weather, have repeatedly drawn attention to this factor and its caprices, and ha

be obtained, and in the interests of safety it has to keep on the move. To attempt to hover within 4,000 feet of the ground is to court certain disaster, inasmuch as the ves

his protection. He can vary his altitude, perhaps only thirty or forty feet, with ease and rapidity, and this erratic movement is more tha

are indispensable to his commander, but in the main the intelligence will be fairly accurate. Undulating flight enables him to determine speedily the altitude at which he is able to obtain the clearest views of the country beneath. Moreover, owing

itutes a specific phase in military operations. They are known respectively as "tactical" and "strategical" movements. The first is somewhat limited i

f the enemy, but, as a rule limits his flight to some distance from his outermost defences. The airman must possess a quick eye, because his especial duty is to note the disposition of the troops immediately facing him, the placing of the artillery, and any local movements of the forces t

ed to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and the work has to be carried out upon a far more comprehensive and elaborate scale, whil

ct. His work not only comprises the general disposition of troops, defences, placing of artillery, points where reserves are being held, high-roads, railways, base camps, and so forth, but he is also instructed to bring back as correct an idea as possible of what the enemy proposes to do,

estimates of the forces beneath and their character. He must possess the ability to read a map rapidly as he moves through the air and to note upon it all information which is likely to be

fearful enemy to combat. Often an airman upon his return from such a reconnaissance has been discovered to be so numbed and dazed as a result of the prolonged exposure, that considerable time has elapsed before he has been sufficiently restored to set forth the results of his observations in a coherent, intelligible manner for the benefit of the General Staff. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the most skilful and experienced aviators are generally reserved

over the enemy's lines, penetrating just as far into hostile territory as the pilot considers advisable, and keeping, of course, within the limits of the radius of action of the machine, as represented

of the wind, or failure to detect any variations in the climatic conditions, is sufficient to prove his undoing. German airmen who essayed journeys of discovery in this manner, often failed to regain their lines because they ventured too far, misjudged the speed of the wind which was

is wide and deep, without any defined channels of communication. But nine times out of ten the adventurous scout is trapped. His chances of escape are slender, because his antagonists dispose themselves strategically in the air. The invader outpaces one, but in so doing comes within range of another. He is so harassed that he either has to give fight, or, finding hi

the superior tactical and strategical acumen of his antagonists, the result being that the German airman, who has merely been trained along certain lines, who is in many cases nothing more than a cog-wheel in a machine, and who is proverbially slow-witt

ial tussle, or the narrowness of the escape, has unnerved the Teuton airmen as a body to a very considerable extent. Often, even when an aeroplane descended within the German lines, it was found that the roving airman ha

rench's famous despatch:-"The British Flying Corps has succeeded in establishing an individual ascendancy, which is as serviceable to us as it is damagin

ey are not of unknown duration or mileage. The man is given a definite duty to perform and he ascends merely to fulfil it, returning with the information at the earliest p

t one of the party may fall a victim to hostile fire. By operating upon these lines there is very little likelihood of the mission proving a complete failure. Even when raids upon certain places such as Dusseldorf, Fried

an area of territory which is to be reconnoitred thoroughly. In this way perhaps one hundred or more miles of the enemy's front are searched for information at one and the same time. The units of the squadron start

n this manner the General Staff is able to learn exactly what is transpiring over a long stretch of the hostile lines, and a considerable distance to the rear of his advance works. Possibly five hundred square miles have been reconnoitred in this manner. Troops have been massed here, lines of communication extend somewh

journey. The roads along which the convoys are moving are indicated upon the map, or the position of the massed troops in bivouac is similarly shown. The airmen load their machines with a full ch

n emulate the leading vessel when attacking the foe. The tactical evolutions have been laid down, and there is rigid adherence thereto, because only thereby may success be achieved. When the last war-plane has completed its work, the leader swings round and repeats the dash upon the foe. A hail of bullets may scream around the men in the air, but one and all follow faithfully in the leader's trail. One or m

be placed in the hand of the pilot himself-in this event the operation is rendered additionally trying, as he also has to attend to his machine must keep his eyes glued to the ground beneath and at the same time be able

tretch, although as a matter of fact it may be extremely undulating. Consequently, it is by no means a simple

rmation which is likely to be of value to his superior officers. He must be able to judge accurately the numbers of troops arrayed beneath him, the lines of the defensive works, to distinguish the defended from the dummy lines which are thrown up to baffle him, and to detect instantly the movement of the troops and the direction, as well as the roads, along which they are proceeding. Reserves and their complement, artillery, railway-lines, roads,

eye has to be set down clearly and intelligibly with the utmost speed. The requisite indications must be made acc

paper in the form of a code, or what may perhaps be described more accurately as a shorthand pictorial interpretation of the things he has witnessed. To the man in the s

Such data may be dropped from the clouds in the form of maps or messages. Although wireless telegraphy is available for this purpose, it suffers from certain drawbacks. If the enemy possesses an equipment which is wi

s the ground the detonator fires a charge which emits a report without damaging the message container, and at the same time fires a combustible charge emitting considerable smoke. The noise attracts anyone in the vicinity of the spot where the message has

he utility of the Fourth Arm in this province has been the subject of considerable speculation. Expert opinion maintains that the advantage in this particular connection would rest with the besiegers. The

ence, since it would be subjected to an effective concentrated fire from the ring of besieging anti-aircraft guns and other weapons. In other words, the theory prevails that an aerial fleet, no matter how efficient, would be rendered ineffective for the simple reason that it would be the initial object of the besieger's attack. Possibly the stem test of experience will rev