Three Years' War

rde

t. That sound gave us all the more reason for haste. We allowed our horses the shortest possible time for rest, partook of

, on the right bank of the Modder River, four miles to the north-east of the mountain, General Cronje's l

iver stood Paardeberg. To the left and to the right of it were khaki-coloured groups dotted everywhere about-Gene

hing forth death and destruction, while from within it at every moment, as each

essary to

ops, those which were stationed in the vicinity of Stinkfontein, and to seiz

north of these ridges, and perhaps a few hundre

to fourteen hundred paces from Stinkfontein, we saw that

ein, whilst I charged the ridges. And this we did, nothing daunted by the tremendous rifle fire which b

glish out of Stinkfontein, and

nding the fact that we occupied good positions, we lost t

bruary-and then were forced to retire. While evacuating our positions, th

ronje, an event which forms one of the most important chapters in the h

become so fatigued, that the guns and a number of the burghers had been left behind. The ridges were so thickly strewn with boulders, that even on the arrival of the guns, it was impossible to place them in position until we had first clear

, and before the sun rose the following

a short distance of our lines. It was the Krupp

r it was almost exhausted, and it would take at lea

d to leave everything behind him, but he and his burghers would have got away in safety. The British had retreated bef

is losses would not have been heavy. His determinati

ion, it is only because I believe that he ought to have sacrificed his own ideas for the good of the nation, and that he

when our guns had cleared a wide path, Commandants Froneman and Potgieter (o

us. It was necessary to prevent the fulfilment of this project. I, therefore, removed the Krupp and the Maxim-Nordenfeldt from their positions, and divided our little force into three portions. I ordered the first to rema

ked he changed his tactics, and while still retaining his wings where they were, in order to keep our men

net Meyer, an officer under Commandant Spruit. Meyer was entirely unable to beat off the attack, and, at nigh

er, and Commandant Spruit, who was ignorant of its meaning, and

et?"[22] he

was the repl

m over a ridge, and struck a light to discover his identity. Finding papers in his pocket w

attack, and so gave orders that whatever happened our positions must be held, fo

y captured, and we all expected a sanguinary engagement on the following morning. We had made up our minds to stand

ht at our posts. Not a man of us slept, but just be

ll

eaning of this?" w

ting an attack every moment. We hold our breath and listen. Is there no sound of approaching footst

ides the exclamation, "If only Cronje would make the a

Nordenfeldt, and this last ammunition must now be expended on the wings. One gun I despatched to the right, the other to the left, and the English were checked in their advance. I had ordered the gunners, as soon

longer any support from the big guns, were unable to stand their ground against the overp

arassed by small-arm fire. All this, however, I could have borne, but now the enemy began to s

. They had seen throughout that this wa

ral, we shall be surroun

o my adjutant forgetting, in the general confusion, to give them my orders to retreat. When Speller found that he, with his fourteen men, was left behind, he defended himself

and left, with guns and Maxims, and for a good nine miles of our retreat we were under their fire. Notwithstanding the fact that during the whole of this time we were also harassed by small-arm fire, we lost-incredible as it may appear

ts, which we had expected from Bloemfontein, arrived, under the command of Vechtgeneraal

that there were three positions which it was necessary for us to take. We agreed that the attack should be made by three separate parties, that General Philip Botha, with Commandant Thewnissen, s

oping, it is difficult for me to hazard an opinion as to whether Commandant Thewnissen was lacking in caution, or whether he was insufficiently supported by General Botha. The burghers who were present at the engagement accused General Botha, while he declared that Thewnissen had been imprudent. However that may

ay with reinforcements. I asked him if he would take a verbal message to General Cronje-I dare not send a written one, lest it should fall i

neral, I

could not have been surpassed throughou

and that, if he should fall into the enemy's hands, it would be the death-blow to all our hopes. Theron was to urge Cronje to abandon the laager, and

es, and to deliver my message. He started on h

ace of meeting, but to my great disapp

ed past the British sentries, tearing his trousers to rags during the process. The blood was running from his knees, where the skin had been scrape

was my disappointment. Alas! my last attempt had been all in

trepid hero that he was-to abandon the laager. His view was that he must stand or fall with it, nor did he consider the certain consequences of his capture. He never realized that it would be the cause of the death of many burghers, an

brim the cup which we had to empty, but this consideration does not excuse General Cronje's conduct

y Lord Roberts' forces. The answer to this is not far to seek. The English at that time did not employ as scouts Kaffirs and Hottentots, who could lead them by night as well as by day. Mo

which this had on the burghers. Depression and discouragement were written on every face. The eff