The Navy as a Fighting Machine

paring the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts

t is clear that the work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the others. The work of preparing any Navy Department necessitates the preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a peace footing to a war fo

utine. The department opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at a certain time in the afternoon. During office hours the various officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them. The naval stations are cond

ne life, expected things occur-it is the office of routine to arrange that expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine life one is always prepared to see a certain t

ks out, they may be prepared either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at once. With whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will depend o

essential that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the tardiness of its additions, should be kept as

fective work by reason of being out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerab

he ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships equipped f

ice, depends greatly on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the vessels in reserve have done. The ideal conditions cannot be reached, unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships required to make fre

rse, with the stationary parts, like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and gas tight at the same time-the parts found mainly in the steam engine

re the requirements are identical. True in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full service requirem

essel on board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead of an asset. She will be able to rende

vies, men are compelled to go into the reserves, and to remain in for several years after completing their periods of service in the regular navy. In this way, no breaking away from the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed, and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. Thus the question of the reserve is a question

to get colliers to serve the fleet with coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. Naturally, the number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on the nature of the war-whether, for instance, a very large force is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a pow

els and men not needed on an expedition across the seas-that is, for vessels

s what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and means. Logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men,

ough an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining from demanding as much as could be supplied. Logistics, of course, does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order

essels and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense

e; and inasmuch as the same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. And as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive, no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree (whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred), it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it. To carry out t

d for exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. Yet there will be no use in working out the math

Sometimes the failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; Napoleon's disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected Russian campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with Napoleon. But is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with Napoleon? What professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was ever more careful than Napo

much to let themselves or others realize that a danger is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them "nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would cause great exert

ations will be of no avail. If we estimate the situation too gravely, we may spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed, and our preparations may be more than adequate. It may be that the preparations which Prussia m

e preparation even more valuable. The reason is very clear, as is shown by the table on page 284 illustrating the progressive wasting o

lly the same results in 1902 by an application of the calculus; and that he submitted them to the U. S. Naval War Col

E I

Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

eginning A 1000 1000 1000 100

700 600 500 4

iod A 100 100 100 100

0 70 60 50

nd of 1st period A 900 910 92

600 500 400

period A 90 91 92

0 60 50 4

end of 2nd period A 810 83

08 507 406

d period A 81 83

61 51 41

t end of 3rd period A 729

523 420 31

th period A 73 7

52 42

at end of 4th period A 65

444 338

5th period A 65

5 44 3

r at end of 5th period

0 370 26

6th period A 59

8 37 2

er at end of 6th perio

416 30

7th period A

42 30

er at end of 7th perio

357 23

n 8th period

36

wer at end of 8th per

302

n 9th period

30

wer at end of 9th per

250

in 10th peri

9 2

ower at end of 10th

9 20

in 11th peri

5 2

ower at end of 11th

14

in 12th pe

31

power at end of 1

83

t

A 717 789 800 700 6

1 317 228 15

parative value of two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical factor is. Two forces with offensive powers of 1,000 and 900 respectively may mean 1,000 men opposed to 900 men of equal average individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting ability; or it may mean 10 ships opposed to 9 like ships, manned by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships, and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as 1,000 to 900. It may be objected

it is at work; that it can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one hour, provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same. Another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; that there is some

e done. In other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, say a 12-inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively. For instance, if one force has 10 ships and the other has 9 like ships, all the ships being so far apart that a sho

uate force, the following table has been calculated to show the effect of forc

E II

Co

Co

power at beginnin

0 100

1st period by

0 10

ower at end of 1st p

0 85

2nd period by

9 8

ower at end of 2nd p

0 71

n 3rd period

9 7

ower at end of 3rd p

9 57

n 4th period

0 5

ower at end of 4th p

6 45

n 5th period

2 4

ower at end of 5th p

0 33

n 6th period

4 3

ower at end of 6th p

70

in 7th perio

47

power at end of 7

05

in 8th perio

41

power at end of 8

34

in 9th per

35

power at end of 9

28

in 10th pe

e power at end of

in 11th pe

e power at end of

e power at end of

oportion of 16 to 9; and that if it is superior in the ratio of 1,100 to 1,000 the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the ratio of 2 to 1, in the proportion of 16 to 6. We

yet in some battles morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than even skill. It is not vital to this discussion which is the more important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and inasmuch as we cannot weigh

sely linked together, and react upon each other. Nothing establishes a good morale more than does the k

the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized, that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success are small. And as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and skill of

very principles which deter a weak country from attacking a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one. There is some

ich Persia, Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Spain gained their pre-eminence; and such were the wars by which they later fell. Such were the wars of Ghenghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mahomet, and Napoleon; such were the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by which as nations they subsequently fell. No greater cause of war has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes of such a character that one was rich and weak, w

yet they really do; for Rome was poor in Julius C?sar's day; and while Gaul an

t Britain and France are now, have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart. The reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. The access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war.

in preparation for war, to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit. The tendency

tates, this means that we should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our Atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous temptation

led crews; and adding besides all the vessels from civil life that will be needed. The vessels taken from civil life will be mostly from the merchant se

Atlantic and the Pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval force between the Atlantic and the Pacific in such a way as shall seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to

ome that one must never divide his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning part to

hen we say this, we make a condensed statement of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as a full statement. The full statement would be: "In the presence of an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could attack each division in detail with a superior force." Napoleon was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of an enemy's force, and he understood better th

hat strategy should so divide it that both divisions would be confronted with forces larger than themselves. It may mean, however, that s

ne force is so large that the addition to it of certain small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas those small units would be of material value elsewhere-say in protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. Practically speaking, therefore, s

by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, three

ade directly on our Atl

ase in the Caribbean, preliminary to an attack on o

prevent the occupation of territory by a foreign

d until after the attacking force had actually sailed. For the force to reach our shores, not more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at mid-Atlantic islands to lay in fuel. It is very doubtful if the fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. It is possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report the fact by radio, bu

ions which strategy demanded, would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. In other words, logistics

ship, especially a battleship, would be an embarrassment, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. The issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be spared that can assist in gaining victory. And even if the older ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of a battle, they would do no harm because they could

nd equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness for them. One field will be in assisting the land defenses, in pro

s would a direct attack on New York, yet the actual establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and despatch; because t

the largest possible scale may be expected. The operations will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the task of logistics will

t the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured without endangering thoroughness. Whether the projected expedition shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate. Troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed. The critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only; since nothing c

sending a modern fleet to a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. The difficulty will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of being able to

e naval expedition of Persia against Greece, B. C. 480, and the despatch of the Spanish Armada in more recent days

he expedition; the international importance attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a long and steady finger at the necessity of atta

gned as permanent parts of the defense of these points, analogous to forts on the land. The naval activities of this species of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of their duty to defend. To guard these, and to get timely information of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy says we m

hostile craft, trying to drag or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must be abl

much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they were small

oats, and trawlers. To find men competent to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive fighting ships. Good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men would fit into the work with considerable ease, an

a peace basis to a war basis. To do these things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged; but if the General Staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried out, and holds a few mobilization drills to t

anger and the sense of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible. Officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station will do the same. No fitting answers can be given, because there will be no time for reflection and deliberation. The fact that it would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it would be useless to do any less, will

placed in situations in which they do not know what to do, and so they do-not nothing, but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than to do the thing they do do. M

y worse situation be imagined-except the situation that would follow when the enemy arrived? The parable of the wise and foolish virgins

it does mean that the actual number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies have had their

of former mechanisms; the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of details-the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds of things that have to be done in preparat

devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed in addition. Clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance to be required of radio apparatus is not to

sel of any kind. The strategist, by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a cer

k independently of each other. Such a procedure would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist did not want, under a mistaken impress

a state of war; which informs the minister at the head of the department what things should be done, and is given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall be able to do them when war breaks. This is t

in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureau

ill be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief to solve a

any course of training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills that are difficult. The simplest of all the preparative drills-if drills they correctly can be called-

nough ammunition, or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there were enough enlisted men-would fulfil all requirements. But in the past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, while the human mind has remained jus

he product that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any observed omission is really important; to decide w

e reason that when on duty together the junior must obey the senior. But even this superiority is purely official; it is a matter of position, and not a matter of honor. All the honor that is connected with any position is not by reason of the position itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue to render in order

great vigilance is needed to prevent it. For the reason that questions of the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance, questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main object is to "make a living"-and as good a living as they can. In the long struggle that has gone on in the Unit

s minds with a desire for material possessions, such as money or political position, and not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. In other words, a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable, is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for opportunity t

exercise of power is a burden-and oftentimes a heavy one. That men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand-unless it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates its pleasing features more than it

ved, to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience, or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? Of course, "power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. B

and should regard national usefulness only. If this be done successfully, and if good selections be made of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of

t if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that

y. Strategy being the art of being a general (strategos), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising generalship without having executive power. It is true that strategy occupies itself mainly with planning-but so does a general; and it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldie

d be like a mind that could think, but wa

es of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute p