The Army of the Cumberland

of Pe

harp cavalry engagement occurred at this place between Buell's advance and Bragg's rear-guard, when the whole of Bragg's command retired, taking the road to Springfield. At Bardstown Buell received information that a junction of Bragg's and Kirby Smith's commands would be made at Danville. He ordered McCook to advance from Bloomfield on the Harrodsburg road, and directed Thomas to move with Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon road, which passes four miles south of Perryville, with a branch to the latter place, while he accompanied Gilbert's corps, which moved on the direct road to Perryville. After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned that Kirby Smith's force had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky River, near Salvisa, and that Bragg was concentrating either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. He at once ordered McCook to change

h, moved off the direct line of march some six miles and was delayed several hours in reaching his position on the field. During the night some pools of water were discovered in small creek about two miles and a h

on services of the rebel Provisional Governor of Kentucky at the capital of the State. At Lexington, on the 2d, learning of Buell's movements from Louisville, Bragg ordered Polk in writing-sending two copies to him-to ad

e sent to Bryantsville, Bragg, on the 6th, proceeded to Harrodsburg, where he met Polk at the head of his column that had left Bardstown on the 3d. On the 7th, Bragg ordered Polk to move Cheatham's division back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point himself, to attack the Federal force, immediately rout them,

s made with great spirit on Colonel McCook, but the enemy was handsomely repulsed. Buell anticipated an attack on Gilbert's corps in its isolated position in the early morning, but nothing occurred until after the arrival of McCook's corps on the Maxville road, between 10 and 11 o'clock, whe

front. During McCook's absence Rousseau had advanced the right of his line a half mile to obtain a supply of water, for which the troops were suffering. On seeing this, the rebels opened

posted in the woods. McCook had formed his line of battle, with Rousseau's right near a barn on the right of the Maxville road, extending to the left and across that road on a ridge through a cornfield to the woods where the skirmishers were. The right of Jackson's line was holding a wooded elevation, running off to the left in rear of Chaplin River, while his left, north of Maxville road, was thrown back in a northwesterly direction, forming an obtuse angle, deflected about thirty degrees along broken heights from their centre and right, the point of the angle being near where the Maxville road crosses Doctor's Creek. The enemy considered the key of McCook's position to be at this crossing, and directed their main attack on that point. McCook had posted Starkweather's brigade in the rear of the left as support to Jackson, with Stone's and Bush's batter

rrill's brigade had been driven back. The enemy made repeated assaults with fresh troops at this point, but was driven back each time with heav

Starkweather's command. The rebels then pushing forward under heavy fire from their batteries drove Lytle's brigade from the new line. Sloan's battery getting into position opened on the rebels with canister and checked their advance. Colonel Gooding's brigade from Mitchell's divis

did, and drove the rebels before them through Perryville, capturing in the town two caissons, fifteen wagons loaded with ammunition, and a guard of 138 men under command of three officers. Sheridan also drove the enemy for some distance, but did not consider it prudent to advance too far, leaving McCook's right exposed. He then directed his artillery fire on the enemy at his left, and aided in checking the advance in that quarter. Wagner's brigade of Wood's division became engaged, and did good service on the right of Mitchell's division. The rest of Crittenden's corps was not engaged in the ac

vents of the day might present, the main attack to be made by the other corps. On the following morning, the advance being made in accordance with these orders, it was discovered that the enemy's main bod

action. His reports show a loss of 4,348, being 916 killed, 2,943 wounded, and 489 missing. Nearly all the losses were from McCook's command, which bore the brunt of the heavy fighting. Bragg referring to his loss in

. Bragg had been with Kirby Smith at Frankfort, where these active operations found him e

, of date May 20, 1863, he reflects very severely upon Polk's movements at Perryville. He says that he ordered the attack to be made by Polk on Gilbert early in the morning of the 8th, that he waited until 10 A.M., and hearing no firing started to see Polk and have an explanation of the delay. Here he was "informed that it was determined not to attack, but to assume the 'defensive offensive.'" Bragg ga

hailed as that of a deliverer, and that the young men of the State would flock to his banners and fill up his army, so that he could attack Buell at any point. Bragg's entire command in Kentucky was estimated at thirty-five to forty thousand. He anticipated enlisting twenty thousand recruits, and took arms to Kentucky for that number of new troops. Buell's command, with his losses and the garrison at Nashville was less than this,

expecting Bragg to give battle at Harrodsburg, and throwing out a strong force to reconnoitre, discovered the enemy in force some three miles south of that place. During the day Bragg continued his march south, his rear guard being driven out of the p

dily pressed on the road to Cumberland Gap, but could not be brought to an engagement. McCook's and Gilbert's corps were halted at Crab Orchard, while Crittenden, with W. S. Smith's division, was sent in pursuit as far as London on the direct road to the Gap. It now appearing that Bragg did not intend to fight in the State, and the country beyond Crab Orchard being extremely barren and rough-no supplies existing in it-the pursuit was di

ads, the advance to be made in the face of the enemy, who, operating on his line of communications could move his entire command to defeat our advance in detail. Buell reported to the War Department that it was impossible to make the campaign as ordered, and knowing the necessity of protecting Nashville, he directed the concentration of his troops on the line of the railroad to that place. That road had been repaired

s one who never for a moment lost faith, soldierly trust, and esteem for his commander, and he was of all persons in the command most competent to judge. This was General Thomas. He knew the great difficulties of Buell's position, how his place had been interfered with by Halleck, under whose command it was his misfortune early in the year to be; and later, how he was made to feel the power of this same man as a perso

me Bragg drew off except at Perryville, and here there was no design of the latter to fight, beyond checking Buell's advance, and gaining time for his troops to make their retreat from the State with all stores and material. Bragg, from his closing remarks in his first report of the battle of Perryville, certainly did not consider-so far as the Confederacy was concerned-

ampaign, in his official report says: "It is true that only one serious battle has been fought, and that was incomplete, and less decisive than it might have been. That this was so is due partly to unavoidable difficulties which prevented the troops, marching on different roads, from getting on the ground simultaneously, but more to the fact that I was not apprised early enough of the condition of affairs on my left. I can find no fault with the former, nor am I disposed at this time to censure the latter, though

e service as requiring it, Buell placed the new commander in full possession of all plans and information that he possessed, and without a word left the troops that

give an air of support to Webster's battery, became frightened and scattered. It is about to be carried, when a new body of troops deploying in the rear of the guns, with as much regularity as if they were on the parade-ground, receives the Confederates with a fire that drives them back in disorder into the ravine. This was the brigade of Ammen, belonging to Nelson's division, that rushed forward so opportunely." In speaking of the second day's fight he says: "At a signal given by Buell, his

recognize the distinction between the regular soldier in garrison during times of peace and the thinking volunteer during the active campaigns of the rebellion. The latter could not and would not be made the mere machine the former becomes, and Buell's failure to appreciate this caused great ill-feeling against him at the time in his army. Then, again, Buell's earlier military training in the bureau office he held so many years unfitted him for the handling, on the battle-field, of the large number of troops which composed his command. But very few generals during the rebellion were able to successfully handle on the battle-field as large an army as was under Buell. In fact, the general who has sufficient talent as a good organizer and drill-master to enter into the details necessary to bring an army out of raw troops, has not the military genius required to handle a large army in fighting

umberland, embracing that portion of the State of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee River, and such portion of Georgia and Alabama

his army organization into "the Right Wing," "the Centre," and "the Left Wing," under the command respectively of McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden, with five divisions in th

ttempt the capture of Nashville or force a battle for it there could be but little doubt. Not to fight for Nashville was the abandonment of Tennessee. Kentucky surrendered without a blow produced such demoralization in Bra

ridge had established his headquarters at Murfreesboro and assumed chief command, with about ten thousand troops under him, over one-third of which were cavalry under Wheeler and Forrest. With this force Breckinridge endeavored to enforce the siege of Nashville, using his cavalry to prevent the gathering of forage and supplies by our troops from the surrounding country. These foraging parties were constantly sent out, going as far at times as ten miles on these expeditions. The main deprivation the garrison suffered during the six weeks of the siege was in having nearly all communication cut off from their friends in the North, and while they received nothing, they embraced every opportunity of sending letters by citizens returning north. The garrison was not willing to remain entirely on the defensive. Besides the numerous raiding parties sent out for forage which were uniformly successful, on the night of the 6th of October, Negley sent Palmer with some twenty-eig

The only appearance of an attack in force was on the 6th of November, by a body of some eight thousand troops, equally divided between cavalry and infantry, under General Roger Hanson. Forrest, knowing that the Federal force at Nashville was not a very strong one and that by the pursuit of Bragg by Buell's army, Nashville was completely cut off from any immediate support or relief, obtained General Breckinridge's permission to make an attack with his cavalry, numbering over four thousand men, in concert with the infantry under Hanson, numbering a little less than Forrest's command. The enemy's cavalry moved in columns on the Charlotte, Fran

d have outnumbered Buell's command before he reached Louisville three to two. With the defeat of Buell, Nashville would have been worse than worthless, proving an incumbrance instead of a benefit. On the other hand, with Bragg driven out of Kentucky, and opening the struggle for that State in Tennessee, the possession of Nashville as a second base of supplies for

me all supplies for troops at Nashville were with the greatest labor hauled fifty-five miles by wagon train. The railroad from Louisville to Nashville was re-opened on the 26th of November, and for one month every effort was made to forward supplies, so the troops could have new clothing issued to them, and that they could be provided with ammunition. The dep?ts at Nashville were filled with needful supplies to provide against the interruption of communication arising from raids on the railroad by rebel cavalry. Since

summer. Moore was surprised in his camp early in the morning. No warning was given by the pickets, and before any disposition could be made of the troops, Morgan's men were upon them. Morgan's command consisted of his cavalry, and two regiments of infantry. Moore threw out a skirmish line to resist the advance of Morgan's infantry and dismounted cavalry in line. The rebels pressed steadily forward to a ravine at the foot of the hill on which Moore had formed his line, and under shelter of this poured such a destructive fire upon the Federal troops, that he ordered a new line to be formed in the rear. In this movement the whole line was thrown into confusion, and being attacked on their right and rear by the rebel cavalry, who

ry to the Commanding General. On the 12th he attacked and drove the enemy out of the town of Franklin, killing five and capturing tw

orce of over four thousand men. This he divided, placing three regiments under Colonel Basil W. Duke, in the first brigade, with a battery of four guns. The second brigade was placed in command of Colonel W. C. P. Breckenridge, and was composed of four regiments, with one three-inch Parrot gun and the two mountain howitzers. This force, trained as it had been, had no superior for the work it was ordered to do-raiding in the rear, destroying bridges, trestleworks, and capturing bridge-guards. So accusto

in fact, they were not built with the expectation of doing so. If the garrison of the stockade succeeded in driving off the guerilla parties that swarmed through the country, it fully accomplished its purpose. This stockade successfully resisted the heavy artillery firing brought to bear upon it, even when a number of shells exploded within the work. After making such a brave defiance, it is to be regretted that they did not hold out to the last, and refuse to surrender at all. The commanding officer had rejected a number of demands made on him to surrender; when Morgan came up in person, and in his own name offering them liberal terms, they surrendered. Morgan then burnt the bridge across Bacon Creek, and pressed on to Nolin, fourteen miles beyond, where the stockade was surrendered without a fight. The bridge here also was destroyed. Morgan's division, on the 27th, captured Elizabethtown, after a severe engagement with the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-a detachment of some six hundred infantry. Smith sent Morgan a demand for him to surrender, which Morgan declined, and returned the compliment by making the same demand on Smith, who also declined. After an engagement lasting some six hours,

ed 150 men. Morgan passed between the forces sent against him, showing again that it is impossible to catch cavalry with infantry. Morgan then commenced his retreat form the State. On the morning of January 1, 1863, as his command w

tion. Crossing the Cumberland Mountains forty miles northeast of Cumberland Gap, he passed through Southwestern Virginia and Tennessee to Carter's Stat