The British Navy in Battle

ter pieces. In each of these actions the side which had the largest number of heavier guns, or generally heavier guns, was successful. A heavy shell obviously has far greater effect than

ons of the systems in use. As my comments on these actions will be particularly directed towards showing the tactical developments that have followed on the advance of gu

in range accuracy as the range increases, but light guns more than heavy. If six 6-inch guns are fired at a target at 12,000 yards the shell will be apt to be spread94 out as shown in the top line. Six 9.2's will fall in a closer pattern,

ate at long range,

the right-hand of the sketch. A is the point where the ship's side meets the water. If the gun were shooting perfectly accurately and was set to 10,000 yards, all the shots would hit at this point. And clearly any shot set at a range greater than this, but one which did not carry the shot over the target, would hit95 the ship somewhere between the points A and

e range-finding, because t

re gradually, will fall at D, which is 100 yards from A; and similarly the 13.5 at E, which is 150 yards beyond it. Hence, at any given range, far more ac

than in bigger. To hit with it at all a more perfect fire control is necessary, and for any given number of96 rounds a much smaller proportion of hits will be made. The advantag

CON

to second. If these movements could be (1) ascertained, (2) integrated, and (3) the results impressed upon the sight, change of range would be eliminated, and we should have come back to the conditions in which ships were stationary. Fire control is successful in so far as it succeeds in doing these three things. Ske

se movements on the range and the rate at

oo short, the second to be too far. The difference is bisected by the third shot. This places the target in one of the halves of the bracket. This half i

nding by

ers the range and the rate. As projectiles take an interval of time to travel from the gun to the target, the range must be forecasted. B, then, cannot engage A unless he knows where A is going to be. He cannot know this until A has settled on a steady course. While A is turning, then he is safe from gunfire except by a chance shot. B cannot engage while he is himself turning unless he can integrate his own movemen

ges of course and speed produc

n a classic example of the tactics that follow from this conception. On the assumption that twenty-five 12-inch gun hits would suffice to sink each of the enemy's armoured cruisers, it appeared that in this engagement the 12-inch gun had attained the rate of one hit per gun per 75 minutes. This figure may be contrasted with the one hit per gun per 72 seconds attained by the Severn in her second engagement with the Koenigsberg at the Rufigi. The contrast seems to show

r perhaps half the time at ranges at which good hitting is made at battle practice; and although two of the enemy battle-cruisers were hit and seen to be in flames they were able, after two

by ten 13.5's and five 12-inch; if we further assume that the effect of shells is proportionate to their weight; if we take the resisting power of British battle-cruisers, German battle-cruisers (which are more heavily armoured than the British), and all battleships to compare as the figures 2, 3, and 4 respectively; if we further assume that the Fifth Battle Squadron did not come into effective action till the second phase began, and went out of action at 6:30, and that the battle cruisers were in action for three hours, and omit Hood's squadron altogether, we get the following results: Five German battle cruisers were exposed to seventy-two hours of 13.5 gun fire and to twenty-four hours of 12-inch gun fire, and five German battleships were exposed to forty-eight 15-inch gun hours. Similarly-omitting Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible, seemingly destroyed by chance shots and

ds have constantly been made. How, then, are we to explain the extraordinary difference between battle practice and battle results? In the former certain difficulties are artificially created, and methods of fire control are employed that can overcome these difficulties successfully. But these method

d the observation of fire, and as at sea the observations must be made from a point at which the gun is fired, the correction of fire becomes impossible if bad light or mist prevents the employment of observing glasses and range-finders. In the Jutland despatch particular attent

t of the difficulty. Those that arise from the man?uvres of the firing ship may be still greater and more confusing. And so obvious is this that, in peace time, it used to be almost an axiom that to put on helm during an engagement-even for the sake of keeping station-should be regarded almost as a crime. But the long-range torpedo has long since made it clear that a firing squadron may have to put on helm. It must man?uvre, that is to say, in self-defence-a thing it would never have to do in battle practice. And whe

PEDO IN

stance of five miles was demonstrated, it became quite obvious that a new and, as many thought, a decisive element had been introduced into naval war, the effect of which would be especially marked in any future fleet actions. Just what form its i

nd that their efficiency (that is, the extent to which they can be relied upon to run well) has increased almost as much as their range and speed. This advance of the torpedo has followed very rapidly on the dev

ner; but, with great respect to those who attach the most importance to this menace, there are, it

arine and dodge the torpedo-at any rate, in some cases. You can never double to avoid a 12-inch shell. It may yet be proved that no

n olden days and the employment of mines of more recent date. It is, of course, an element in fighting, and a most serious element; a means of offence far handier, and with a power of striking at a far greater dista

ls of war. In the hands of a Cochrane their employment might conceivably be decisive.

of fleet actions or of naval war generally can be affected by them. It seems indisputable that the future must be with the means of offence that has the longest reach, can deliver its blow

iceably affected by the new weapon are in the formation of fleets and t

ine-field can be made to traverse the line of an on-coming squadron, and do so at a range of 10,000 yards, and that ships formed in line ahead offer between five and six times more favourable a target to perpendicular submarine attack than a li

ange is greater if fired on the bow of an advancing squadron by the distance that squadron may travel-3,000 to106 4,000 yards-while the torpedo is doing its 10,000. A very fast battle-cruiser, for instance, may have a speed only

y and gunnery under helm were: the first

0

AR

SIVE USE OF TOR

ed when the torpedo meets it. In the upper sketch the ship is running away from the torpedo, in the lower one coming to meet it. The distance run by