New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1

illuminate many other people's weaknesses as well as my own. It may be that the master of the house was burned because he was drunk; it may be that the mistress of the house was burned because she w

ut the present European conflag

r the question of why England came to be in it at all; as one asks how a man fell down a coal hole, or failed to ke

Prussia promised that if she might break in through her own broken promise and ours she would break in and not steal. In

rantee he had signed on behalf of Maria Theresa he then describes how Frederick sought to put things straight by a promise that was an insult. "If she would but let him have Silesia, he would, he said, stand by her against any power which should try to deprive her o

That Might

t one can almost prove them with plans and diagrams, as in Euclid. One could make a kind of comic calendar of what would have happened t

rmany inva

ngland de

promises not t

nd withdraws

nexes Belgium. Eng

not to annex France. Engl

nnexes France. En

promises not t

aws from the war. Ger

in which promises are all fetiches in front of us and all fragments behind us? No; upon the cold facts of the final negotiations, as t

n persons whom the Austrian Government believed to be conspirators from Servia. The. Austrian Government piled up arms and armies, but said not a word either to Servia, their suspect, or Italy, th

ands on

and told Servia to submit to this within forty-eight hours. In other words, the Sovereign of Servia was practically told to take off not only the laurels of two great campaigns, but his own lawful and national crown, and to do it in a time i

were relative. If any one asks why the Czar should rush to the support of Servia, it is easy to ask why the Kaiser should rush to the support

ument, much affected by the professional rhetoricans of Prussia, who are sent out to instruct and correct the minds of Americans or Scandinavians. It consists of going into convulsions of incredulity and scorn at the m

ept Her C

emains that we did not do what the Germans did. We did not invade Holland to seize a naval and commercial advantage; and whether they say that we wished to do it in our greed or feared to do it in our cowardice, the fact remains that we did not do it. Unless this common sense principle be kept in view, I cannot conceive how any quarrel can possibly be judged. A contract may be made between t

is nonsense to call a man perfidious because he keeps his promise. It is absurd to complain of the sudden treachery of a business man in turning up punctually to his appointment, or the unfair shock given to a creditor by the debtor paying his debts. Lastly, there is an attitude not unknown in the crisis against which I should particularly like to protest. I should address my protest especially to those lovers and pursuers of peace who, very shortsightedly, have occasionally adopted it. I mean the attitude which is impatient of these preliminary details about who did this or that and whether it

tain Peac

t nations should no longer settle theirs by public violence. They are always telling us that we no longer fight duels, and need no longer w

are all responsible for this, but let us hope it will not spread. Let us hope for the happy, happy day when he shall leave off chopping at the man's head, and when nobody shall ever chop anything forever and

ject of punishment. We do not go into the dull details; we do inquire into the origins; we do emphati

ut Italy. But there was a reason for its being wrong everywhere, and of that root reason, which has moved half the world against it, I shall speak later in this series. For that is something too omnipresent to be proved, too indisputable to be he