Loss of the Steamship 'Titanic'

ILING

proper to the particular time of the year, and agreed upon by the great steamship companies, are to be generally adhered to. Should any master see fit during this passage to deviate from his route he has to re

; there are in this book no special instructions in regard to ice, but there is a general instr

pointed to command a ship is addressed by special letter fro

ention upon a cautious, prudent, and ever-watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or

tors, in his evidence says with

mere matter of form; that we wish them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgment to us

UTE FO

en the great North Atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. Speaking generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the Atlantic, and also with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound mail

ight and a point in latitude 42° N. and 47° W. (sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by Rhumb Line so as to pass just south of the Nantucket

of the edge of the area marked "field ice between March and July," but from 100 to 300 miles to the northward (that i

ears, this track might be taken as passing clear of field ice under the usual condit

south-eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22

of ice in 1903, 1904, and 1905 from about early in April to mid-June or early in July, westward-bound vessels

ydrographic office at the Admiralty, indicate the caution which i

Pilot (East Coast)," Part I (second edition, 1909, p. 34), referring to

ice, released at the breaking up of winter in the Arctic regions, and drifted down by the Labrador current across their direct route. Ice is more likely to be encountered in this route betw

he specific gravity of fresh-water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven-eighths that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one-eighth of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and subject to the deep-water currents of the ocean. The track of an iceberg is ind

s, but especially during the spring and summer seasons. From this chart it would appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are about latitude 42° N., and longitu

in, on

down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons. Everything must depend u

ia (Southeast Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot" (sixth edition

ster of the Titanic (together with other necessary

ld ice observed so far south, at the particular time of year when the Titanic disaster occurred; but it is t

arious forms of ice to be met with in these latitudes,

out to sea. The ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of quite fresh w

ow a small portion above the surface. It is not infrequently a berg which has turned over,

eces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind and current, so as to form a practically

ed to frozen sea water floating i

applied to the same ice (i.e.,

ified mass of floe ice

SAGES R

April 14, in the usual way. At 11.40 p. m. on that day she str

eless message from the steamship Caronia wa

IN, T

wlers, and field ice in 42° N., from

A

t 48 hours before the time of the collision. At the time this message was received the Titanic's position w

rom the steamship Baltic was receiv

MITH, T

ice to-day in latitude 41° 51′ N., longitude 49° 52′ W. Last night we spoke German oiltank steamer Deutschland, Stettin to Philadelphia, not under con

MAN

position was about 42° 35′ N., 45° 50′ W. Capt. Sm

to be expected. Mr. Ismay states that he understood from the message that they would get up to the ice "that night." Mr. Ismay showed this message to two ladies, and it is therefore probable that many persons on board became aware of its contents. This message

think it was irregular for the master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it, but the inci

message was sent from the German steamer Amerika to the Hydrog

icebergs in 41° 27′ N.,

g navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken to the bridge. So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by anyone on board the Titanic outside the Marconi room. There were two Marconi operators in the Marconi room, namely, Phillips, who perished, and Bride, who survived and gave evidence. Bride did not receive the Amerika mess

urning, with the result that she found herself, after altering course at 5.50 p. m., about 4 or 5 miles south of the customary route on a course S. 86° W. true. Her course, as thus set, would bring her at the time of the collision to a point about 2 miles to the southward of the customary route and 4 miles south and considerably to t

oni operator Bride to have been delivered to the bridge. This message was from the steamship

AIN, An

tude 42° 3′ N., longitude 49° 9′ W. Three la

O

r to what officer he d

ornian. As to the ice advised by the Caronia message, so far as it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to th

om of the Titanic at 9.40 p. m. This was from a stea

"Titanic" and all

to longitude 50° 30′ W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great

ter showed him the Caronia message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14, when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the Titanic would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer (dead). He does not remember being told anything about the Baltic message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr. Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8 o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned

e first place, a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the breeze t

there was any breeze on t

s a slight breeze. Oh, pardon me, no; I tak

, that about 9 o'clock the master came on the bridge and that Mr. Lightoller had a conversation with him which last

water ripples breaking on the base of the berg * * * We then discussed the indications of ice. I remember saying, "In any case, there will be a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." He said, "Oh, yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." I said or he said-blue was said between us-that even though the blue side of the berg was towards us, probably t

about his own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30

it becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just in

e heard Mr. Lightoller give the message to Mr. Moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the time (Jewell and Symons) speak to having received it. From 9.30 to 10 o'clock, when his watch ended, Mr. Lightoller remained on the bridge "looking out for ice." He also said that the night order book for the 14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this note was "in

here is a glow coming from that, and I

the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of li

OF THE

mum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable. At

he fourth officer, when working up the position from 7.30 p. m. to the time of the collision, states he estimated the Titan

THER CO

re was, however, a drop in temperature of 10° in slightly less than two hours, and by about 7.30 p. m. the temperature was 33° F., and it eventually fell to 32° F. That th

f temperature, either of the air or sea, on approaching ice. Some decrease in te

eton was, however

ally for the time of the year, I would consider that

SHOULD HAV

sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. I accept the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be bound in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify it. In these circumstances I am not able to blame Capt. Smith. He had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position. It was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between Mr.

COLL

that the ship was within the region where ice had been reported. He also told him of the message h

immediately afterward by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously with the three-gong signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately tel

lever over which closed the water-tigh

the bridge and asked Mr. Murd

rdoch

and I was going to hard-a-port round it, but she was too close

as found that traveling at the same rate as the Titanic, about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard. In this time the ship would travel ab

he stemhead, crow's nest, and on the bridge, not to see an iceberg at th

d in the next section, were of such a kind t

he Ship and of its Gradual and Fina

e to the ship

OF THE

to the bottom of the starboard side of the vessel at about 10 feet above the le

2 hold, No. 3 hold, No. 6 bo

ed over a length

CH THE DAMA

have passed through 300 feet in less than 10 seco

G IN FIRST

to consider what happened

rlop deck-i.e., the peak tank top, from

there was 7

he starboard side, so that the ship's side was damaged abaft of bulkhead B sufficiently to open the side of the fire

soon after the collision. The floor of

ome of the firemen immediately went through the water-tight door opening to No. 5 boiler room because the water was flooding the place. The water-tight doors in the engine rooms were

2 feet from the water-tight bulkhead between Nos. 5 and 6 boiler rooms. Water poured in at that place as it would from an ordinary fire

no indication of any damage at

FFECT OF

he keel in all these compartments except No. 5 boiler room. After the first ten minutes the water rose steadily in all these six compartments. The forepeak above the peak tank was not filled until an hour after the collision, when the vessel's bo

and driving the firemen out. It was rushing round No. 1 hatch on G deck and coming mostly f

s on E deck through a burst fore and aft wooden bulkhead of a third-class cabin opposite the seame

es after the collision. The bottom of the mail room w

t the fore and after ends of No.

within 2 feet of G deck, rising fast whe

hen no wate

room on the orlop deck immediately below. There was water in this baggage room 25 minutes a

ent to within 2 feet of G deck in 20 minu

e water had risen to 8 feet above the top of the double bottom, and probably reached the top of the bul

ates, until a rush of water came through the pass between the

plates in a stream about the size of a deck hose. The door in this bunker had been dropped probably when water was first discovered, which was a few minutes after the collision. This w

in forward, in No. 4 boiler room, from underneath the floor in the forward par

the reciprocating engine room, and from there on deck. There was no water in the boiler rooms abaft No. 4 one hour

tunnels.-There was no dam

ows that there was no dama

t of the main engine room we

rs from the engine room to the stokehold were opened

ECT OF TH

d with any precision, owing to a confusion of th

collision (1.45 a. m.). At this time the fore deck was under water. The forecastle head was not then subme

t deck almost immediately afterwards. After this the other port collapsible (B), which had been stowed on the officers' house, w

account, seemed to take a dive, and he just walked into the water.

not break in two, and she did, eventually, attain the perpendicular, when the second funnel from aft about

h may be attributed to the boilers leaving their beds and crashing down on to or through the bulkh

of the boat deck she went down more qui

RVAT

d. Her bulkheads were spaced to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in communication with the

s could have been flooded by the damage received w

gh it would have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. But the ship, even with these four compartments flooded, woul

f the forward boiler room (No. 6) and to flow over into the next boiler room (No. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after bulkhead would be overwhelmed a

keel in the first 10 minutes. This was at a rate of inflow with which the ship's pumps could not possibly

le amount of water was in either of these compartments for an hour after the collision. The rate at which water came into No. 6 boiler room makes it highly probable

room was only about equal to the flow of

ne, was only enough to admit about 3 feet of

boiler rooms did not appreciably

l suction pipe which was carried from aft is more likely to have been carried for use in No. 5 than No. 4 because the doors were ordered to be ope

for No. 5, is that Scott, a greaser, says that he saw engineers dragging the suction pipe along

p as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No. 6 boiler room

question of what would have happened to the

powers of the pumps to keep under, then, if the bulkheads had been carried to C deck, the ship might have been

there is no evidence to show that they were again closed. Though it is probable that the engineers who remained below would have closed these doors as the water rose in the compartments, y

en, for the water would have flowed through them to the after part of the ship, and the rate of flow of the water into

on of hastening the sinking of the ship, except that, in the case of the doors not having been closed by the engineers, it might have retarded the sinking of the ship if they had not acte

er room, but even if they had succeeded in getting all the pumps in the ship to wor

ADDITIONAL SUBDIVI

ntage might be obtained from the point of view

able to form an opinion in the case of the Titanic as to whether making the bulkhead deck water-tight would

d have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a water-tight deck. If, however, No. 4 boiler room had also been flooded the ship would not have rema

urpose it would have been necessary to carry water-tight tru

carried to C deck the ship would have remained afloat if the co

c if a water-tight deck had been fitted below the water line, as there may be some objections to such a deck. There are ma

ntages of longitudinal subdivision by means of water

in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as suppose

ions, and I think that for ships generally the matter should be re

rrying the double bottom higher up the side than was done in the Titanic, and that some of the boiler rooms w

an advantage, but it was pointed out in evidence that there are ce

ivision, it is unnecessary further to discuss the question of carrying up the double bot

y appreciable effect upon the sinking of the ship caused by either shutting or not shutting the doors. There does not appear

ency of the closing arrangement of the water-tight doors may exert a vital influence on the safety

ere should be water-tight doors, and, if there should be water-t

owever, should come under the effective supervision of the board of trade much more than it seems to come at present, and should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their

"TITA

ater-tight bulkheads. The heavy line shows the top of the water-tight bulkheads. The crossha

Saving and Rescue o

BO

collapsible boats. Two of these were stowed on the boat deck and 2 on the roof of the officers' quarters, and were designed to carry 47 persons each. Thus the total boat accommodation was for 1,178 persons. The boats in davits were numbered, the odd numbers being on the starboard side and the even numbers on the port side. The numbering began with the emergency boats, which were forward, and ran aft. Thus the boats on the starboard s

maining portion, such as lamps, compasses, and biscuits being stowed in the ship in some convenient place, ready for use when required. Much examination was directed at the hearing to showing that some

osted up in convenient places for the men to see; but it appeared that in some ca

ls or musters, although there is a provision (sec. 9 of the merchant shipping act of 1906) that when a boat drill does take place the master of the vessel is, under a penalty, to record the fact in his log. I think it is desirable that the board of trade shoul

e, the emigration officer, and that, as a result, Mr. Clarke gave his certificate that the boats were satisfac

five officers. It did not proceed quickly at first; the crew arrived on the boat deck only gradually, and there was an average of not more than three deck hands to each boat. At 12.20 the order was given to swing out the boats, and this work was at once commenced

Mr. Murdoch gave the order to lower No. 7 boat (on the starboard side) to the water. The work of uncovering, filling, and lowering the boats was done under the following supervision: Mr. Lowe, the fifth officer, saw to Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7; Mr. Murdoch (lost) saw also to 1 and 7 and to A and C. Mr. Mo

icer, Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all went down with the ship while performing their duties. The others, with the excep

but I think it is necessary to say that these, and, indeed, all the times sub

rd Side. No

m.

46 6

.55

0 10

10 1

20 1

25 16

.35

.35

40 D

A [

o the deck, and the ship had at this time a list. Very few of the deck hands were left in the ship, as they had nearly all gone to man the lifeboats, and the stewards and firemen were unaccustomed to work the

he ship in each boat. In three or four instances the numbers of women and children are only arrived at by subtracting the numbers of c

t

o

i

o

Me

w.

ss

s.

n

n. Tota

i

No. M

w.

ss

s.

n

ren.

0 27 6

0 41 8

25 50 10

12 2 4

2 56 12

60 70 1

64 16

53 70

4 71 D

] B

6 355 461

ral

f cre

assen

nd chil

e 712 saved, 189 were in fact men of the crew, 129 were male passengers, and 394 were women and children. In other words, the real proportion of women to men saved was much less than the proportion appearing in the evidence from the boats. Allowing for those subsequently picked up, of the 712 persons saved only 652 could have left the Titanic in boats, or an average of about 36 per boat. There was a tendency in the evidence to exaggerate the numbers in each boat, to exaggerate the proportion of women to men, and to diminish the number of crew. I do not attribute this to any wish on the

the boats was good, but the organization should have been better, and

get into the boats. Many people thought that the risk in the ship was less than the risk in the boats. This explanation is supported by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the Carpathia. He says that after those who were saved got on board his ship he was told by some of them that when the boats first left the Titanic the people "really would not be put in the boats; they did not want to go in." There was a large body of evidence from the Titanic to the same effect, and I have no doubt that many people, particularly women, refused to leave the deck for the boats. At one time the master appears to have had the intention of putting the people into the boats from the gangway doors in the side of the ship. This was possibly with a view to allay the fears of th

ny of the lifeboats leaving without a full boat load; but I think, nevertheless, that if the boats had been kept a little longer before being lowered, or if the after gangway doors had been opened, more passengers might have been induced to enter the boats. And if women could not be induced to enter the boats, the boats ought then to have been filled up with men. It is difficult to account for so many of the lifeboa

case with boat No. 1. It may reasonably have been thought that the risk of making the attempt was too great; but it seems to me that if the attempt had been made by some of these boats it might have been the means of saving a few more lives. Subject to these few adverse comments, I have nothing but praise for both passengers and crew. All

C. DUFF GORDO

ery gross charge against Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon that, having got into No. 1 boat, he bribed the men in it to row away from drowning people is unfounded. I have said that the members of the crew in that boat might have made some attempt to save the people in the water, and that such an attempt would probably have been s

ait on board until the vessel foundered. I do not agree. Mr. Ismay, after rendering assistance to many passengers, found C collapsible, the last boat on the starboard side, actually being lower

-CLASS PA

in these suggestions. It is no doubt true that the proportion of third-class passengers saved falls far short of the proportion of the first and second class, but this is accounted for by the greater reluctance of the third-class passengers to leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by the difficul

tempt was made to keep back the third-class passengers. * * * I desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they di

ss passengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that the third-class

TO PROCURE

." This was heard by the Cunard steamer Carpathia, which was at this time bound from New York to Liverpool and 58 miles away. The Carpathia answered, saying that she was coming to the assistance of the Titanic. This was reported to Capt. Smith on the boat deck. At 12.26 a message was sent out, "Sinking; can not hear for noise of steam." Many other messages were also sent, but as they were only hear

1 emergency boat on the boat deck. They were the ordinary distress signals, exploding in the air and throwing off white stars. The firing of

t 5 or 6 miles. He got no answer. In all, Mr. Boxall fired about eight rockets. There appears to be no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the Californian. The evidence from the Ca

THE STEAMSHI

e Cunard Line, Mr. Arthur Henry Rostron, master, was on her passage to

Rostron was altering his course continually in order to avoid icebergs. He fired rockets in answer to the signals he saw from Boxall's boat. At 4 o'clock he considered he was practically up to the position given and he stopped his ship at 4.05. He sighted the first boat (No. 2) and picked her up at 4.10. There was then a large number of icebergs around him, and it was just daylight. Eventually he picked up in all 13 lifeboats, two emergency boats, and two collapsible boats, a

rned to New York with the passe

dmiration of Capt. Rostron's conduct. H

ERS

g were the n

t cl

out of 175, or

0 out of 144, or

dren (all

ildren (a

325, or 62.

nd c

out of 168, o

0 out of 93, or

dren (all

ldren (all

285, or 41.

d cl

out of 462, or

6 out of 165, o

3 out of 48, or

14 out of 31, or

706, or 25.

of 1,316, or 3

w s

43 out of 66, or

ment 72 out of 325

ing dep

ut of 23) 97 out of 4

of 885, or 2

d 711 out of 2,201,

gers a

out of 1,667, or

6 out of 425, or

t of 109, or 5

of 2,201, or 3

n Connection with the

der the circumstances relatin

Boston, United States, where she subsequently arrived on April 19. She was a vessel of 6,223 tons gross and 4,038 net. Her full speed was 12-1/2 to 13 knots. Sh

il 14, a wireless message was sen

AIN, An

ude 42° 3′ N., longitude 49° 9′ W. Three lar

O

tor (Evans) of the Californian offered this ice report to the Marconi

you sending it to the Ant

e, when she was obliged to stop and reverse engines because she was running into fie

estroyed. It is a position about 19 miles N. by E. of the position of the Titanic when she foundered, and is said to have been fixed by dead reckoning and verified by observations. I am satisfied that this position is no

Evans did, calling up the Titanic and sending: "We are stopped and surrounded by ice." The Titanic replied: "Keep out." The Titanic was in communication with Cape Race, which station was then sending messages to her. The reason why the Titanic answered "keep out" was that her Marconi operator could not

He considered that at 11 o'clock she was approximately 6 or 7 miles away, and at some time between 11 and 11.30 he first saw her green light; she was then about 5 miles

who was the officer of the first watch, it would appear that the

this to the master; he added, "She is evidently a passenger steamer." In fact, Mr. Groves never appears to have had any doubt on this subject. In answer to a quest

deck at midnight, said, referring to this steamer: "It could n

emarked: "That does not look like a passenger steamer." Mr. Groves replied: "It is, sir. When she stopped her lights seemed to go out, and I suppose they have been put out for the night." Mr. Groves states that these li

rt after she stopped, it might account for the diminution of lights, by many of them

fectual (although at one moment he thought he was being answered), and he gave it up. He remained on the bridge until relieved by Mr. Stone, the second officer, just after midnight. In turning the Californian over to him, he pointed

d that you say was a passenger steamer, was the Titanic?-Do I think it? Yes. From what I have heard subsequently? Yes. Most decidedly I

t the steamer to him with instructions to tell him if her bearings altered or if she got any clo

first supposed, the masthead light flickering. Sometime after 12.30 a. m., Gill, the donkey man, states that he saw two rockets fired from the ship which he had been observing, and about 1.10 a. m., Mr. Stone reported to the captain by voice pipe, that he had seen five white rockets from the direction of the steamer. He states that the master answered, "Are they company's signals?" and that he replied, "I do not know, but they appear to me to be white rockets." The mast

conversation passed between them. Mr. Stone remarked to Gibson: "Look at her now, she looks very queer out of water, her lights look queer." He also is s

ired at about 1.40, and after watching the steamer for

of these white lights like white rockets in the direction of this other steamer; that this steamer was disappeari

at at this time the master was awake. It was five minutes past two, and Gibson returned to the bridge to Mr. Stone and reported. They both continued to keep the ship under o

as no color in the lights. "I again assured him they were all white, just white rockets." There is considerable discrepancy between the evidence of Mr. Stone and that of the master. The latter states that he went to the voice pipe at about 1.15, but was told then o

ight with two white masthead lights and a few lights amidships. He asked Mr. Stone whether he thought this was the steamer which had fired rockets, and Mr. Stone said he did not think it was. At 4.30 he called the master and informed him that Mr. Stone had told him he had seen rockets in the middle watch. The m

c had struck a berg, passengers in boats, ship sinking;" and he at on

hich ship he closed soon afterwards, and he stated that the position where he subsequently left this wreckage was 41° 33′ N.; 50° 1′ W. It is said in the evidence of Mr. Stewart that the position of the Californian was verified by stellar observations at 7.30 p. m. on th

the Titanic's position as given by that ship when making the CQD. signal was approximately S. 16° W. (true), 19 miles from the Californian; and further that the position in which the Cal

The Californian saw distress signals. The number sent up by the Titanic was about eight. The Californian saw eight. The time over which the rockets from the Titanic were sent up was from about 12.45 to 1.45 o'clock. It was about this time that the Californian saw the rockets. At 2.40 Mr. Sto

ed that the distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles. The ice by which the Californian was surrounded was loose ice extending for a distance of not more than 2 or 3 miles in the direction of the Titanic. The night was clear and the sea was

of Trade's A

invited by the

administration of those acts, and of such rules and regulations so far as the consideration thereof

d failed to keep up to date their rules and regulations relating generally to the provision of life-saving appliances at sea, and, secondly, it was said that their off

of their principal officers, to inquire into the question of boats, rafts, and life-saving apparatus carried by sea-going merchant ships. In their report this committee pointed out that, as regards boats for ocean-going steamers carrying large numbers of passengers, the boats would be of little use in s

the stormy character of the ocean they have to cross, and the thick and foggy weather encountered, we think this class is the most importa

ed only carry sufficient boat accommodation for 216 of these people. Thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of vessels are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of passengers on board. We are glad to be able to say that there

ased 100 per cent., and in addition to them that the owners should be induced to carry sufficient collapsible boats and approved rafts, so that each ship shall have sufficien

Lord Charles Beresford was the chairman, was appointed to r

t into the water in sufficient time in the event of very rapid foundering. Having regard, however, to the fact that accidents occur probably as often in moderate weather as in bad, and having regard also to the fact that the very cause of the accident frequently incapacitates many of the boats, and to t

a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits and their minimum cubic contents was issued by the board. It was dated March 9, 1894, and came into operation on June 1 of that year. This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of

the boats required by the table should provide together in vessels of 5,000 tons and upwards three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by the table, so that in the case of an emigrant ship such as the Titanic the requirements under the rules and table together exacted a provision of 9,625 cubic feet of lifeboat and raft accommodation (5,500 feet in boats under davits with three

e of Commons a reference to water-tight bulkheads

having heard the evidence, that the proper placing of bulkheads, so as to enable a ship to keep afloat for some length of time after an acciden

n the board of trade's rules for life-saving a

trade, they shall only be required to carry additional boats, rafts and buoyant apparatus of one-half of the capacity required by these

r, become applicable for the owners never required the board of trade to express any opinion under the rule as to the efficiency of the water-tight compartments. The Titanic, in fact, carried boat accommodation for 1,178 persons, a number far in exce

d before Parliament in the usual way, and s

essity for increased lifeboat accommodation would grow; but the rules and table remained stationary and nothing was done to them by way of change. The explanation of this long delay (from 1894-1912) was given bef

ered from my experience that that was the maximum number that could be rapidly dealt with at sea and that could be safely housed without incumbering the vessel's decks unduly. In the next place I considered that the traffic was very safe on account of the routes, the definite routes being agreed upon by the different companies, which tended to lessen the risk of collision and to avoid ice and fog. Then again, there was the question of wireless telegraphy, which had already come into force on board of these passenger ships. I was seized of the fact that in July, 1901, the Lucania had been fitted with wireless telegraphy, and the Cunard Line generally fitted it during that year to all their ships. The Allan Line fitted it in 1902, and I am not sure that in 1904 it had not become quite general on the trans-Atlantic ships. That, of course, entered into my consideration as well. Then an

s of 10,000 tons and upward remained sufficient to 1910, when vessels of 45,000 tons were being built. Two considerations demonstrate this. The first is that some shipowners recognized the insufficiency of the requirements of the board of trade, and voluntarily exceed

The answer given was that the Olympic (which was then in course of construction) would carry 14 lifeboats and two ordinary boats of an aggregate capacity of 9,752 cubic feet, which was in excess of the requirements of the statutory rules. On February 15, 191

is engaging the serious attention of the board of trade, and I have decided to refer

e existing boat scale as he might think satisfactory and reasonable for the conditions of large passenger steamers. This circular letter was answered by the principal officer in Glasgow (Mr. Harris) on February 24, 1911, by the principal

he disaster (2,201). It would not, however, have been nearly sufficient to have held all that the vessel might lawfully have carried, viz, 3,547, and it is to be observed with reference to Mr. Archer's scale that in it he suggests an extension of rule 12, by which (if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight compartments) the total boat accommodation might be reduced much more than rule 12 as it stands would permit. If this reduction be ta

mmittee, and obtained the committee's report on July 4, 1911. The following are copies (with omissions of immateria

ade, Marine

ehall

W., April

ttee, a copy of a question asked in the House of Commons on February 15 and of the answer given by the president of the b

ld be extended upward in the form indicated in the accompanying scale, so

rease in a regular proportion according to the increase in tonnage, and that due regard should

ittee would be so good as to suggest in what manner the scale (see accompanying copy

12 should or should not be revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional boats or rafts thos

., WALTER

SECR

pping Adviso

pping Adviso

4,

nd upward, and your letter of May 17 on the subject of the depth of lifeboats, have been very carefully considered by the merchant shipping advisory committee and th

ittee desire us to suggest for the consideration of the board of tra

re,

HILL, C

TTHEW, S

TER J.

y Marine Departmen

ANCES SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE MERCH

ked to advise: (1) As to the manner in which the table in the appendix to the Life-Saving Appliances Rules should be extended so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross and upward; and (2) as to whether rule 12

se in proportion to the increase in the tonnage of the vessel. This is particularly true in the case of vessels exceeding 10,000 tons, a

ssel is only one of the factors, and often not the most material factor contributing to the increase in its tonnage, and it should also be remembered, in estimating the sp

sels which by their construction have been rendered as unsinkable as possible, and which are provi

ions, we have agreed upon t

hether it is practicable to

arried can probably be best effected by providing for t

be extended in the mann

onnage.

ber

ts

ed u

s. Mi

ber

iti

ts

ad

ila

atta

s. Total

u

ten

s re

lu

an

ic

under 12,00

under 20,00

under 35,00

under 45,00

d upward

of 10,000 tons gross tonnage and upward should be req

roved type being stowed on top of one another or under an open lifeboat, subject

liances Rules shall be of at least such carrying capacity that they, and the boats required by columns 2 and 3 of the

quirement of additional boats and (or) rafts. The committee suggest, in this connection, that the board of trade should review the requirements designed to attain the standards as to water-tight c

e opinion of the advisory committee, it would be advisable to prescribe a maximum depth

rts from their principal officers in Great Britain, giving the dimensions and cubic

ances Rules so as to provide that, in future, the depth of lifeboats supplie

AN H

CRO

N. HA

ROY

NCER. A. M

ODORE D

A. OG

R

ELOCK

0, namely, 6,225), with, however, this qualification that if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight compartments (as she probably was) and fitted with wireless telegraphy (as she certainly was) a provision of a boat capacity of

everal experiments which caused delay; and it was not until April 16, 1912, that a reply was sent by the board of trade to the advisory committee. It will be noticed that the date of this reply is just after the disaster to the Titanic became known. I am

ade, Marine

ehall

W., April

the Life-Saving Appliances Rules, I am directed by the board of trade to state, for the information of the advisory committee, that th

number of boats to be placed under davits, the board are glad to observe that the committee agree that alterations and additions are now necessary to me

er of boats is not in the number to be placed under davits, but in the number of additional boats required to be readily available for attachments to davits. It is observed that the committee hold the view that "it is questionable

to new ships, as they see no reason why there would be any difficulty in having more than eight pairs of davits on each s

ransmit herewith a copy of a memorandum and tables prepared by the professional advisor to the marine department,

type being stowed one above another, or under an open lifeboat, I am to state that this question

endation are of wide application and of such importance that the board do not think that they can be adequately considered except by a committee of equal standing to the committee whi

ed 44 per cent. of their breadth, I am to transmit herewith, for their consideration, a draft amendme

r safety and utility, and the ratio of that depth to the breadth, and they attach so much importance to this element of boat construction that they think it should receive the careful a

oranda by the professional adviser to the marine

to ships already built, and if so, to what extent. They regard it as of great importance, on the one hand, that all British vessels should be provided with a proper and sufficient equipment of life-sa

the seventeenth schedule to the merchant shipping act, 1894, the board have followed the course adopted on previous occasions, and have invited Lloyd's Register of British and Fo

., WALTER

SECR

pping Adviso

all Garde

IFE-SAVING APP

e boats are of greater value than a large number of indifferent ones; but if the former desirable condition can be obtained by the proposed alterati

e increase of cubic capacity dealt with by them on the same occasion, perhaps the board might inform the committee that they are not

hereto and submit, as showing a more reasonable proportionate increase in capacity than appears so far, in my opinion, in the other papers before us. It will be seen

t occurred to me that if, after the figure 5,500 cubic feet the increase of capacity were uniform and moderate it would result in a total at 1-3/4 which would by incidence fit in with the scale of boats already recommended as requisite in the report of the advisory committee and in my own, i. e., assuming that the boats are of 500 cubic feet. Example: Take a ves

ncidental ta

ofessional adviser o

28,

tension of

ns. Boat

al

ten

o

uir

car

n

vi

ic

under 12,

under 15,

under 20,

under 25,

under 30,

under 35,

under 40,

under 45,

under 50,

nd upwar

mber of boats can provide for the three-quarters additional capa

H

cidence (in

tons.

s. C

Cubi

ional

u

e

. Equ

at

0

u

et

0

u

e

12,000 16 5,500

15,000 18 5,800 4

20,000 20 6,100 4

25,000 22 6,400 4

30,000 24 6,700 5

35,000 24 7,000 5

40,000 24 7,300 5

45,000 24 7,600 5

50,000 26 7,900 5

rd 26 8,200 6,1

but they should not exceed 500 cubic feet in capacit

H

30,

MENT OF GEN

and shall be of such form and proportions that they shall have sufficient freeboard, and a

as practicable, and bottom boards must be fitted so that t

f the board of trade. Internal buoyancy apparatus may be constructed of wood, or of copper or

uted as in rule (2), at least 1 cubic foot of strong and serviceable inclosed air-tight compartments, so constructed that water can not find its way into them. In the

having inside and outside buoyancy apparatus together equal in efficiency to the buoyancy apparatus provided fo

attached to the inside and (or) outside of the boat, equal in efficiency to one-half of the buoyancy apparatus provided for

ion shall be a properly const

be a boat of approved construction, for

ction (D) or section (E) shall be ascertained by multiplying the product of the

nk amidships. The actual depth shall be measured from the top of the gunwale to the top of the bottom plank next to the keel, but the depth used in calculating the cubic capacity shall not in any case ex

om of the rowlock is to be considered as the

e cubic capacity of a boat shall be ascertained by Stirli

er of cubic feet ascertained as in rule (2) divided by 10, and the number of persons[6] an open boat of section (B) or section (C), or an open or decked boat of section (D) or section (E) shall be deemed fit

half an inch for each foot of its length and that the boat's half-girth amidships measured outside the planking from the side of the keel to the top of the gunwale is at least equal to nine-tenths of the sum of the boat's depth inside and half its maximum breadth amids

ber of persons ascertained as in paragraph (A) of this clause, unless the top of the deck amid

open or decked boat is fit to carry, he may require the boat t

amended, are not to be retrospective, an

'S B

ct is the consensus of opinion that the form of a boat is the chief fact

a large proportion where the boats are not only not so good, but which can only be regarded a

ts; (2) in the efforts of the ship-builder, as a rule, to carry out the specification in which he has contracted to supply the owners with boats at a price, often very low, and naturally he does not sublet his contract with the boatbuilder at a loss; (3) the aim of the competing boatbuilder, which is

B ×

soon he fines away to the ends, with the result that the stability of the boat becomes almost entirely dependent upon the form o

ould have by dispensing with sheer and increasing the depth from keel to gunwale amidships. This method of buildin

sition that the usual full form of boat would not be largely departed from. Experience has shown, however, that form is frequently sacrificed

est attained by the putting into practice of the suggestions made by the principal ship surveyor for amending the rules and which aim at prolonging the form or fullness of dimension of the midship body under water well toward the ends of the boat. It is well known that by extending the body in this way greater buoyancy and stability are secured without materially affecting the speed. It is often supposed that defective stability due to bad form can be rectified by the disposition of the persons or things, but anyone with r

× 8.5

ns amidships and at quarter distance

may be required at sea, the under-water or bearing surface should be carried out to the ends as much as possible and all straight lines avoided. The bow

that the most generally approved

0

erous tests recently conducted by the board's surveyors at various ports,

h proper sheer and under-water surface she is easy in a seaway. If the gunwale is too high, there is loss of power over the oars, which is serious when

was felt for the safety of those on board when crowded in accordance to the existing rules. If it was thus in smooth water, one dare hardly contemplate the results in a seaway. If the shipowner does not see t

H

23,

ION OF SH

l factors that govern the dimensions of boats formin

hich to stow the boats is generally limited, it is generally found easier to increase their depth than the length or breadth, and this is further encouraged, I believe, by the cost of boats being quo

he gigs and many of the smaller boats have portable washboards. It must also be remembered that all the navy boats are square-sterned, except the whaleboat, and are designed with easy lines so as to make good sailers; no air cases are fitted, and the seats are kept very low. The boats are not provided s

with that obtained by the

In the mercantile marine it may, and often does, happen, that the boats are crowded with panic-stricken men, women, and children, and instances have occurred, I believe, wherein ther

the maximum number of people without overcrowding; and with (2) a reasonable amount

is satisfied; depth has very little influence on it. For example, take a boat 30

6

ch a boat

× 9

2

h should be ample if all sit in the bottom who can

f length to breadth, as suggested from Liverpool, or to limit the depth to the cube root of the length, as proposed by one of the London surveyors. Mr. Gemmell gives particulars, M. 26

being satisfactory, the exception being rather tender and overcrowded, due to poor lines. The freeboards of all these boat

oat 3.75 deep and having a ratio of

g a ratio D/b = 0.455, which he considered to

ficient seating and stability. Capt. Clarke tested a boat 24.4 × 6.55 × 2.45, which was very unsafe with the rule complement on board. The ratio D/b is only 0.38 in this case. It will be seen

ably and with different workmen. Something more is required than a limitation in the ratio of depth to breadth. It is desirable that the sheer should be ample, and the form not unduly fined away within the

r of gravity and decrease in the stability and difficulty in rowing. A boat 3.6 deep would have the thwarts about 3 feet above the bottom, and any increase in this height makes it very difficult for any ordinary man to row when sitting down. In rough sea the men would have very little control over the oars if standing up. A further objection to the very deep boat is its

ised should be such as are of easy and ready application, and which will not bear harshly on the boats that have already

ess the boat has been found capable of carrying that number by actual test in the water, or unless the boat has at least 1/2 inch of sheer per foot of length, and the half-girth amidships, measured outside the plank, from the side of the keel to the top of the gunw

able, and the bottom boards should be so fitted that the heig

J

RY 27

g principal Ship Surveyo

lkheads mentioned in the paragraphs of this lett

and sent three letters to the Advis

rine Department, 7

W., April

etter from this department of April 16, I am directed by the board of trade to state that as an entirely new situation has been created by the recent disaster to the steamship Titanic they assume that the c

ly dealt with in the life-saving appliances rules, e.g., in regard to (1) steamship routes in the North Atlantic; (2) the speed of steamers where there may be dangers to navigation; and (3) the provision and use of searchlights on large passenger st

m,

R J.

SECR

pping Adviso

ade, Marine

ns, London, S. W.

s to admit of decked lifeboats being stowed one above another or one under an open lifeboat, was under consideration, I am directed by the board of trade to state, for the information of your committee, that the board of trade will be glad if the committee will consider whether any, and if so what, amendments of the rules, and in par

s being prepared so as to be in rea

m,

R J.

SECR

pping Adviso

ade, Marine

ehall G

W., April

apart from the questions which have been raised regarding the boat accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons, it seems desirable to consider whether the provision of boats and other life-saving appliances required by the rules in the case of vessels under 10,000 tons is sa

., WALTER

SECR

pping Adviso

dvisory committee sent

pping Adviso

ehall G

W., April

inform you that your letters of the 16th, 20th, 24th, and 25th in

until the arrival of outside succor has created an entirely new situation which was neither in the contemplation of the board of trade

pted by the original life-saving appliances committee, and which principles had apparently been fully justified by many years of experience. It is with satisfaction that the co

stability and sea-going qualities of the ship itself, and to the prompt and efficient handling of the boats carried under the existing scale, which hitherto have proved not only essential to safety, but also adequate for all ordinary emergencies. The questions involved are not free from difficulty, but they will receive the immediate attention o

nstruction of water-tight bulkheads, review the requirements designed to attain the standards at present enforced under rule 12, the advisory committee note that the board of trade have under consideration the appointment of a c

rding the boat accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons, is for the first time referred to the advisory committee by the letter of the 25th instant, toge

on. These subcommittees will pursue their inquiries concurrently, and we are desired by the advisory committee to inform you tha

re,

HILL, C

TTHEW, S

J. HOWELL

cretary Mari

of T

ed by the board of trade o

ade, Marine

ehall G

. W., May

thank you for, your letter of April 27, stating that their letters of April 16,

to observe that the question of a general revision of the life-saving appliances rules is also under consideration by the committee, and in this connection they presume that, in considering the question of a general revision of the rules including the table, the committee will consider the principles on which the requirements as t

of water-tight bulkheads is desirable. Steps have already been taken by the president to form such a committee, and he hopes to be able to

deal concurrently with the subjects requiring detailed consideratio

l important aspects of the question of life-saving appliances, whether expressly dealt with in the statutory rules or not, and in p

., WALTER

SECR

pping Adviso

all Garde

Alfred Chalmers. I am, however, doubtful whether even if the rules had been revised the change would have been such as to have required boat accommodation which would have increased the number of lives saved. Having regard to the recommendations of the advisory committee, the board of trade would probably not have felt justif

tments is of supreme importance, but it is clear that it should not be sought at the expense of a decrease in boat accommodation. When naval architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable, the question of boat accommodation may have to be reconsidered, but until that time arrives boat accommodation should, where practicable, be carried for all on board. This suggestion may be thought by some to be extravagant. It has never been enforced in the mercantile marine of Great Britain, nor as far as I know in that

nd in the inspection of the work done upon her, the charges broke down. Suggestions were made that the board's requirements fell short of those of Lloyd's Registry; but no evidence wa

DE AS REGARDS THE SUPERVIS

and constructed to meet the conting

y spaced and were carried up in the vessel to a height greater than

four water-tight bulkheads-a provision quite inadequate for safety in a collision damaging the vessel abaft the collision bulkhead. They can also, if invited by the shipowner (but not otherwise), exercise supervision under rule 12. This supervision, I am told, they have been invited to exercise in only 103 cases over a period of 18 years. In 69 of these cases the bo