History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4)

to retreat, but s

at no time shared them; yet he was disinclined to retreat. He re-created a staff,[96] examined a fresh defensive position, and determined to stand his ground. Sending for his commanding officers shortly after midday, he pointed out the new site he had selected below the sloping shoulder of one of the foremost spurs of Indumeni, about a mile south of their present camp, and desired them to rendezvous upon it with their commands at 2.30 p.m., less, however, with any intention of occupying it definitely than of seeing how the troops "fitted into

for rein

ngements, declaring his expectation of being attacked from both sides, and asking for reinforcements. Before the message had reached its destination, a shell from a heavy piece upon the western shoulder of Impati burst in front of the new line. Others followed quickly, some into the deserted camp where the hospital tents stood up as a target, some into the entrenchments, others into the cavalry, who had taken ground in the rear of the line of defence, and further up the slopes of Indumeni. One falling into a tin house, which lay behind the left, killed

ents canno

formed him that the reinforcements, which at this juncture he desired more than promotion, could not be sent. The troops at Ladysmith,-telegraphed the Chief Staff Officer,-were engaged at Ela

will

in had become indistinct in the twilight. He was long in the saddle, examining the northern slopes of Indumeni for a suitable spot. Night drew on, the rain in

ves a

and mounted infantry, was quietly withdrawn, and made its way safely to the place appointed, where it found cover behind the reverse slopes. The remainder, marching punctually, covered by a rearguard of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, reached

ews of Ela

ouncing a victory on the previous day at Elandslaagte. "The British force from Ladysmith,"-telegraphed Sir Albert Hime,-"comple

to intercep

White's cavalry, and he determined to attempt to intercept them. Glencoe Junction, at the mouth of the Biggarsberg, appe

Tartar a

to silence the Impati battery from near the left of the Dublin Fusiliers. The enemy's shooting was as accurate as it was impartial, though it was singularly ineffective. Shells of 96 lbs. weight burst between the guns of the 67th battery, amongst the troops and baggage, and all over the camp, doing no other damage than to add to the sufferings of the wounded lying, with the apprehension of helpless men, in the field hospital.[97] The descent of mist, however, soon put an end to the bombardment, and the mounted arms, pushing forward towards Glencoe, endeavoured to carry out the original intention. But instead of fugitives, they found the Boers showing a firm front on the high land north and west of the station, and some slight intercha

attempt retreat,

. White with his determination. Before it could be despatched, at 6.30 p.m. a telegram from Ladysmith was placed in his hands. It was Sir G. White's reply to his request for reinforcements, and it banished the last cause for hes

at be

dee at the foot of Indumeni, the troops passed close to the bivouac ground of the 21st October. Outside the town Major Wickham's convoy stood waiting, and when, at the right moment, the signal was given, the above-mentioned wagons fell into their place in the line of march. The pace was rapid, despite the impenetrable gloom. Skirting Dundee, the route turned sharply south-east around the corner of the Helpmakaar road. On the edge of the town the precaution was taken to cut the telegraph wire to Greytown.[99] By 4.30 a.m. October 23rd, the leading files having traversed safely the defile of Blesboklaagte[100], had made good twelve miles of the road to Helpmakaar, fourteen miles from the starting-point. Near Dewaas, Yule, sending a message to Ladysmith to announce his progress, halted on open ground, over which piquets were at once thrown out on every side, and the batteries formed up for action. Ten a.m. was the hour of starting again, the Royal Irish Fusiliers relieving the King's Royal Rifles as advance guard. A b

s occupy

the horrors of further bombardment. Captain A. E. Milner was therefore sent with a white flag to ask that the fire should be stopped. Thereupon Erasmus' men, to whom news of Yule's evacuation was a complete surprise, filed down the mountain, and approached, not without caution. There was soon no room for doubt; Dundee had fallen, and Erasmus' prize was large in inverse proportion to the share he had taken in capturing it. No sooner wa

h Oct. 23r

by the Dublin Fusiliers, marched punctually and well. By dawn the dangerous defile was safely threaded and the force debouched on to the broad veld which rolls about the southern buttresses of the Biggarsberg. At 6 a.m.

th, moves to

of his senior officers, Yule determined to despatch at once a portion of his command to co-operate. Yule himself, though now almost prostrate with illness and fatigue, rode out westward at the head of the 67th and 69th field bat

ses Waschba

. His men were back in bivouac at 4 p.m. No sooner had the infantry from the height above filed over the muddy pools than a storm, which had been gathering all day in the terrible heat, burst, and cooled the sun-baked ground with a waterspout of rain. The Waschbank, which had all but perished in the drought, in less than an hour rose from three

e gets touc

t which swells upwards from the southern bank of the stream, and after covering some four and a half miles, was again halted at 3.45 p.m. upon the summit of a high ridge due north of Kankana Mountain. Here preparations were made to pass the night; the piquets went out, rations were distributed and cooked. At 5 p.m., however, a patrol of the 5th Lancers from Ladysmi

ch Oct. 2

kness, strove with much suffering to drag the rocking wagons through the mud, and, as is their habit when overmastered by their load, threw themselves often in confusion athwart the track and enforced a halt. At 9 p.m. the whole of the transport stuck fast for more than two hours. The rearguard closed up, but the troops in front of the baggage, knowing nothing of its misfortunes, and travelling on a road not destroyed by its

s relief

a battalion 1st Manchester regiment, the 21st battery R.F.A., and a convoy containing two days' supplies, which General Yule had asked for, in a message despatched from the bivouac at the Waschbank river on the 24th. Coxhead immediately gained touch with Yule by means of his mounted troops, and learni

eat ends

e up to Modder Spruit. An hour later the Leicestershire regiment and the King's Royal Rifles arrived, much exhausted, but in good order. After a brief halt they went on into the town, which t

fontein actio

erous than it appeared, for Yule was marching in greater obscurity than either he, or Sir G. White, imagined. When, indeed, on the morning of the 24th, the Free Staters saw troops issuing from Ladysmith, they believed them to be the combined forces of Generals White and Yule,[104] though the latter was at the moment still actually upon the wrong side of the Waschbank. At still greater cross-purposes was Erasmus, who set off on the morning of the 24th, with so little hope of overtaking the retreat that he chose the only rou

fontein

jutting from the western extremity of the ridge, to rear itself again eight hundred yards beyond into a line of abrupt heights. The southernmost of these, called Intintanyoni,[106] leaped up steeply from the hollow, and beyond and behind it stretched many leagues of rolling ground, with scarce a subsidence until they merged in the tumultuous billows of the Drakensberg. Two grassy pinnacl

occupat

lehem, Vrede, and Heilbron; about the eastern peak of Intintanyoni the Winburg commando held the ground, in charge of two pieces of artillery; on their right, occupying the rest of the mountain, the burghers of Kroonstad made ready; whilst those of Harrismith disposed themselves partly upon a supporting position in re

marches out

it, a squadron of 5th Lancers, supported by two others, drove back at the gallop the small parties of Boers hovering in that neighbourhood, and themselves seized and held this advanced position. The remainder of the cavalry, stringing out along high ground dominating the western bank of the spruit, and facing more to the eastward, formed a strong flank guard towards Jonono's Kop. At 8 a.m., whilst fitful discharges of musketry rose and fell along the widely-extended line of troopers, the infantry had come up to Rietfontein. No sooner had they arrived at a point on the road some five hundred yards east of the Modder Spruit, than a loud report broke from the eastern peak of Intintanyoni, and a shell, bursting on impact,

seize ridge

as vigorously. Of the artillery, the 42nd battery was quickly in action near the centre of the front, whilst the 53rd unlimbered some six hundred yards to the left, and began shelling a rocky underfeature of Intintanyoni, at a range of 1,500 yards. Sharp musketry assailed them. Then the 42nd battery, being ordered further to the left, passed behind the 53rd and the 10th Mountain battery, which had come into line on the left of the 53rd, and opened 1,900 yards from the summit of Intintanyoni. Thus began a severe fire fight at ranges va

ward in

tack, be withdrawn. Fortunately, as the attempt was promptly ordered to cease, though many had been wounded, only six were killed in the adventure. Meanwhile the shooting over their heads had been continuous. The enemy, encouraged by this event, and by the immobility of Sir G. White's line of battle, which they imagined to be awed from its purpose by their resistance, still clung to their fastness, and maintained a heavy though spasmodic fire. More than once the gunners of the still uninjured piece beneath the eastern peak made efforts to drag it forward into action, but the British artillerymen watched the spot narrowly, and each attempt was blown back by shrapnel, under which Intintanyoni burst into flames. Many of the Boer ponies herded in rear, terrified by the blaze, stampeded. Then, up on Nodashwana, amongst the Harrismith men, a stir was descried which seemed to threaten an outflanking man?uvre against the British left. Sir G. White, anxious for his communications with Ladysmith,

to La

ry little despondency. Unaware of the true situation of the Dundee column, they misunderstood operations designed to keep them from it. The demonstration against Intintanyoni seemed to them nothing less than a serious attempt to drive them from their hold, and the retreat of the British to be that of a baffled army. Thus, ignorant of their strategical defeat, they rejoiced at what seemed a tact