Defenseless America

a; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers who have great n

Wilhe

f Parliament, and said to him, "Now, my boy, I want you to wi

American legislative proceedings, he would find still greate

etary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are generally civilian politicians. It certainly does seem inconsistent to take a man out of civil life, who, very likely, may be wholly ignorant of naval and military matters, and, through

ident. Those important offices should be lifted out of politics. A man's political qualifications for an office usually depend not a whit upon his b

quared with the generally accepted moral code and standard of human behavior. A Secretary of the Army or a Secretary of the Navy may, by previous training,

tion, training, and experience. Evidently, it would be disastrous to place in supreme command of a hospital first an allopath, then change him a month later for a homeopath, replace the homeo

rs of men, are able to make use of the greater knowledge and experience of those under them, and they have the additional advantage of being en rapport with the civilian's point of view, while from the fact that they are civil

ne and to know its needs than is a person who has had no such knowledge and no such experience. In legal matters, we go to a lawyer t

ent on the needs of our Army and Navy. They are as unable correctly to diagnose the condition of our Navy and to prescribe rati

is patent truth-that a person educated and trained to a thing all his life ought to know

not permitted to give public expression

Times the following remark

ief of staff of the army, to call upon Captain William Mitchell, of the general staff, to ex

States about three years to put an army of one million trained men in the f

d such utterances, if made in public

rtunity to give the alarm to its fellows; yet our army and navy men, under the present gag rule, are not given a sportsman's chance to escape being shot, through our national unpreparedness,

safeguard the country against war, or even to avert disaster in case of war, and yet, when there arises a casus belli, Congress feels no m

ng-line, they cannot retire, but must keep thei

rawn up to defend a baggage train. They held their places, and loaded and fired until their ammunition was exhausted; and still they held their places under a rai

c value than their lives. When food runs short, it sometimes becomes strategically a good bargain to sacrifice the lives of a thousand men in a

ficers the public expression of their opinions, which would give the country the benefit of their knowledge and experience. Not only this, but it is a great injus

t of an enemy, those officers who must stand on the bridge and at their posts on the

th and the naked truth, then very likely their lives could be

stones of Rome, "would rise and mutiny" against the legislative and bureaucratic officialdom and the fanatical pea

national defense. These are the army and the navy. When army and navy are weak, then the nation, regardless of other elements of prowess, is correspondingly weak, and, more than that, the nation that is not safeguarded by a strong army and

ime successfully to be disputed. The value of wealth depends entirely upon the ability of i

s wealth depends entirely upon its ability to control an

continued possession and benefit of it, and to ensure to our children and our children's children the possession and

oorest; for, in proportion to our wealth, we are the most defenseless. By consequence, w

e the only possible means by which Ameri

e company, and just as the property is by such guaranty enhanced in value more than the cost of the guaranty, so the guaranty of title t

lved in the maintenance of title. Also, when a nation, like the United States, has a world-compassing commerce, its obligations are just as large as its commerce, and its need of a navy adequate to defend its commerce is, for that

ltimately to repel invasion, still the cost in life and treasure for repulsion and expulsion wo

we ought not to have any at all. But there is one ground, I think, for common agreement: Admiral Austin M. Knight, President of the Nav

can possibly be made. And everybody who knows anything abo

r from a recent spee

ficient navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which co?rdinates their capabilities and directs their efforts towards a common end, wisely selected and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking. We are lacking also in that harmoniou

e Navy, where spirit is everything, where enthusiasm must be the driving power back of every activity, I ask you to picture the effect of a condition where a young officer

t all administrations up to some recent date have been models of wisdom and efficiency, or that Naval Officers themselves have always been ready with good advice. Speaking as the representative of Naval Officers as a body, I frankly admit that we have not always seen clearly what was needed, and have not always worked together even for ends which we did see clearly. As for the Secretaries of the Navy, it is not surprising that

we afford to spend for efficiency? Behind the responsibility of Congress lies the responsibility of the Country,-and you, gentlemen, represent the Country-because it has not insisted upon having what was needed, without reference to cost. It may be that this attitude of both Congress and the Country is necessary and even inevitable

e to use our Navy only for repelling aggression, it does not follow that we should plan for meeting the aggressor only at our gates. Even if we had no interests outside our borders and no responsibilities for the defense of our outlying possessions and dependencies, we should still, as reasonable beings not wholly ignorant of history, prepare to project our battle line toward the enemy's coasts and to assume a course which would throw upon him the burden of replying to our initiativ

nnel. If, on the other hand, we do need a navy, there is one consideration, and one consideration alone, that can rig

y upon its fighting adequacy against a possible opponent. An ocean-liner is built, manned, and coaled to fight tempestuous seas, and safely make the voyage; but unless the ship is built sufficientl

n defeat the fleet of an enemy, and return from t

aval victory might likely win the war. It is for this big difference that we need a navy. Conseque

asted; the only votes that are of value to the winner are those that constitute his majority. Similarly, in a naval battle, it is the majority of votes cast by

in the value of one battleship, which giv

night rec

t, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the Fleet. Every effort which does not directly contribute to this

s, like that of the construction of our first three battleships, the Oregon, the Massachusetts, and the Indiana, merely for coast-defense purposes. None of these ships was qualified for service in distant waters. Then, when the war with Spain came, we held our breath while the Oregon rounded the Horn. Think of the Unite

play we must provide ourselves with the weapons with which they are providing themselves. If we do not, we shall be brushed aside with a ruthles

y of sufficient prowess to enable us to reach that Canal at all times, and under all co

more powerful than ours, we should be immediately isolated from the Panama Canal zo

ons of the world may use it. We generously built it for the world's welfare. It will, however, be valuable in time of war for the passage of our warships; in fact, it will be a

to us. Immediately following the Spanish War, we rapidly built up our Navy, until it became second only to that of England. But we hav

on over existing types of fighting ships as was Ericsson's Monitor over the fighting s

that it took its place at once as the indispensable first-line battleship. England, Germany, France, Japan, each re

a revolution in battleship construction. Instead of naval appropriations being increased according to our needs, they were decreased. As a result,

. Here, the question naturally arises: How would they be able to get past our coast fortifications? We have spent about $160,000,000 on our coast fortifications, but they were never intended for the pro

t fortifications should not be so named; instead, they

s. The only coast fortifications that can effectually serve us are battleships. It is absolutely indispensable to

ascertain what our naval needs are? How shall we p

f the Navy, headed by Admiral Dewey. This Board studied our needs w

but little attention to these advisers. It is a principle of our government that the voice of the greatest number shall rule, and the people of this country have come to believe that the majority is more

unt of ignorance does not raise the high-water mark of their united wisdom. Wisdom means intellectu

cannot be used as a yard-stick for measuring his intellectual height. Sincerity and conscientiousnes

of Vital Importa

than there is in the physical. If we take a man six feet high, and stand another man beside him of equal or less height, the height of the two men is no greater than that of the

entatives and in the Senate, and the total height of the voting wisdom of the majority will be only the average heig

know much more about the needs of the Navy and what Congress should do for

nown by all the other members in Congress. In fact, he may likely know more about the subject and be able to advise the country with greater wis

e been decided in each case by one man, and all great national crises have depended upon the decisive

nd Cimbri solely by the military genius of Marius. C?sar walked alone through Gaul, solitary in his height above his whole army; by comparison, all men of his age were pygmies. Charles Martel alone saved Europe from the Moors. Peter the Great, the amazing architect of Russia, was impatient of advice and brooked no interference with his purpose. Cromwell alone was the governing brain of England. Frederick the Great was great because

s been. Great national games

sed of such soul, courage, and wisdom as shall qualify him to use the power of his hig

own to the entire American Congress, still Congress, dominated by the pride of ignorance, believes that it knows best, oblivi

ess, not the General Board, decides how many battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines we shall have; how many officers and men th

new construction, which were set at the minimum of national requirements; and it is due to forcing the matter by this action that the British have the four b

in a remarkable series of articles written before the outbreak of the present w

and less in military matters. The British people do not want to bother, they do not want to pay, they

is greater and nearer than it was when I began t

service. They will shout for the Empire, but they will not pay for the Empire or fight for it. Germany knows this.

received letters of strong approval from Lord Roberts and Lord Ch

owledge confined in these islands to the lawyer who runs our Army, the lawyer wh

ze. They were hoping for a cheaper way out of the difficulty. They were waiting for something to turn up. The Germans knew this, and

nation boldly for the full amount required, and set about the necessary work in e

we are lost. We cannot bluff our enemy. We cannot evade him. We cannot buy safety for an old song. We can

weak course when we ought to have taken the strong one. E

forward; when they tried to save a few millions they should have laid out fifty millions. Instead of re

t were afraid.

mans, but a friend. I like Germany; but I love England, as a m

anger; and we are unrea

the British people t

inging blood from the veins of thousands upon thousands of young men gathered from the length and breadth of the whole empire, and wringing tears from millions of mourning eyes; let us take this powerful appeal of Blatchford to the En

have in kinds of ships, in numbers of ships, and in personnel, ar

nger point as they dare, in order that their recommendations may stand a better chance of approval by Congress. But Congress assumes that, being naval men,

the second line, with four building and authorized, which will make 37 in all. The

e the General Board thinks that

and tactical work on board auxiliary vessels, and without any provision for warships now building. As a bare fact, we have only 52,300 men. Thus we are short 18,000 of the men

can be enlisted and drilled; but the ears of Congress are deaf to the appeal. Yet a whisper fo

Strength o

in our naval militia. W

of his investigations, that it would take fi

e latest and most successful type. As a matter of fact, this number is far too few. We now have but 58 submarines, in

port by the General Board of the Navy

overnment to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war; and this infer

ained as to benefit in the highest degree from team work. It must b

er cruisers, transports, scouts, destroyers, submarines, colliers, tank-ships, supply ships,

l Fisk

mine-layers. On board that one mine-layer are only 336

The videttes are called the eyes of an army. Similarly, the scouts of a fleet are the eyes of the fleet. A fleet without these eyes, when hunted by a fleet that has them, is in the same p

without them-are relatively in the position of two men, armed with revolv

destroyers. A fleet should always be accompanied by a large number of these vessels to support the scouts, and also to do scout duty

d scouts; for the sole reason that our enemies were even more miserably unprepared than ourselves. Had we, at the ti

then our Navy with improvised ships and personnel after war is declared, and get it in trim to meet a modern fleet in the pink of condition of preparedness, as

ized. The greatest intelligence and skill are called into play t

or boat-racing, baseball, football, and competitive contests of the gymnasium. The personnel is kept in the pi

. When they meet, it is not the strength, skill, and endurance of the normal man that counts in the fight, but it is the supernormal manhood that has been added to the norma

d have no more chance of success against an army and fleet of a European nation or of Ja

should be allowed to exist. When a fleet goes into distant waters, it should have a nearby base. We have neither the coaling sta

Panama Canal, but we have no dry-docks or efficient repair-s

ght declares, very conceivably double the efficiency of the fleet in a critical

r the direction of personnel; but these bureaus are not responsible for the

ategy and Operations' preferably not co-equal with the present Bureaus but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition

ng for Strategy this Division would plan what to do; and as standing for Operations, it would direct the execution of its plans. It would cor

n, including complements of ships as affecting total numbers, system of gunnery and torpedo exercises of the fleet, and tactical employment of air-craft, and all military ques

priated for the

d attention to the fact that a large proportion of the money appropriated for the upbuilding

ury, we spent $1,656,000,000 on our Navy, while du

dreadnoughts a year, for the past fifteen years, costing $15,000,000 each, with $60,000,000 to spare for battle-cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. In short, had we spent our naval appropriations as economically as have the Germans during the past fifteen years, we might have had thirty mo

rtant and so ably expressed that I can do no be

on of both a Northern and Southern Senator, each of whom was a member of the Committee on Naval Affa

ssed valuation-and later an additional amount of $600,000 was expended to obtain there an absolu

an expense of $1,122,800, and later it was found necessary to blast away rock

and maintenance in the yard amounted to $10,857,693, al

thern Senator, at a cost of $450,000, which proved useless, and, although the original cost of t

lk Navy-Yard located at Hampton Roads. The $5,000,000 which has been squandered at Charleston includes a dry-dock built for battleships, costing $1,250,000, but which experience shows can only be used by torpedo-boat destroyers and gunboats. The $5,000,000 could have been employed to great advantage at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, where the battleship fleet ge

ld be determined by strategic conditions, their number by the actual needs of the fleet. The ma

itain, with a navy more than double the size of ours, and more than three ti

ith land, public works, improvements, machinery, and m

Port Royal, New London, Sackett's Harbor(New York), Culebra,and Cavité, none of which was a first-class station. The average yearly cost of maintaining these stations between 1905 and 1910 was $1,672,675, and very little usef

fficient anchorage for the entire fleet, north of the Delaware, equipped for docking, repairing, etc., and another sta

and the other at Mare Island, established in 1850, some thirty miles from the harbor of San Francisco, with inadequate depth and width of water along its water-front. The total costs, with

ten ships of the first line and eleven of the second, according to the Navy Departmen

e useful would require an additional force of 18,556 men and 933 line officers, acco

jority of our people, nor is it realized to what extent political influences have misdirected the

e appointed to investigate

vy be appointed to recommend what naval stations shall be abolish

House, with the chiefs of staff from the Army and Navy, that more efficient co-operation may be obtain

ablish a general