Christianity and Greek Philosophy

ERS OF ATHENS

IC SCHOOL

PHANES--PARMENIDES--ZENO.

TIC S

RAT

d classifies, and generalizes facts, and thence attains a general principle or law, two only methods were possible to the early speculators who sought

and original of all the rest, and from which, by a vital transformation, or by a mechanical combination and arrangement of parts, all the rest should be evolved. The other class passed beyond the simple phenomena, and considered only the abstract relations of phenomena amon

an school proceeded, and estimated the results attain

N OR IDEAL

niverse by the abstract conceptions of number, proportion, order, and harmony; and, 2d, The Metaphysical school, which attempte

.C. 605) was the founder o

works ascribed to Tim?us and Archytas are spurious; and the treatise of Ocellus Lucanus on 'The Nature of the All' can not have been written by a Pythagorean." 427 The only writers who can be regarded as at all reliable are Plato and Aristotle; and the opinions they represent are not so much those of Pythagoras a

wes's "Biographical Histo

forms and successive changes of the universe there is some permanent principle of unity 428 The Ionian school sought that principle in some common

us," ch. ix. p. 331 (Bohn's edition); A

ties," and, "as it were, a material cause of things," 429 or, in other words, "that numbers

) Aristotle's "Metaph

eturn) Id., ib.,

art in the development of ancient philosophy, and who exerted so powerful a determining influence on the entire current of speculative thought, did not obtain his ascendency over the intellectual manhood of Greece by the utterance of such enigmas. And further, in interpreting the philosophic opinions of the ancients, we must be guided by this fundamental canon--"The human mind has, under the necessary operation of its own laws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, and the human heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages." Now if a careful philosophic criticism can not render the reported opinions of an ancient teacher into the universal language of the reason and heart of humanity, we must conclude either that his opinions were misunderstood and misrepresented by some of his successors, or else that he stands in utter isolation, both f

"History of Ancient Phi

"Biographical History

erts, again and again, that the Pythagoreans taught "that numbers are the principles and substance of things as well as the causes of the

s integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits the egotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has the full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly associates the "numbers" of Pythagoras with the "forms" and "ideas" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies "forms" and "numbers," and regards

(bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells us that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a cause of motion in the whole universe, and also of well and fit." We may further ask, is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final cause, even according to Aristotle? He also totally misrepresents Plato's doctrine of "Ideas." "Plato's Ideas," he says, "are substantial existences--real beings" ("Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ix.). Whereas, as we shall subsequently show, "they are o

oes not say "forms are numbers." He says: "God formed things as they firs

) Aristotle's "Metaph

conclusively (and we can verify his conclusions for ourselves), that Aristotle has totally misrepresented Plato. And if, in the same connection, and

The True, the Beautiful,

s after which created things were framed. The numbers of Pythagoras, then, are also models and exemplars. This also is admitted by Aristotle. The Pythagoreans indeed affirm that entities subsist by an imitation (μ?μησι?) of numbers. 437 Now if ideas, forms, numbers, were the models or paradigms after which "the Operator" formed all things, surely it can not be logical to say they were the "material" out of which all things were framed, much less the "effic

) Aristotle's "Metaph

ave previously remarked, to the relations of phenomena, and having discovered certain "numerical similitudes," they imagined they had attained an universal principle, or law. "If all the essential properties and attributes of things were fully represented by the relations of numbers, the philosophy which supplied such an explanation of the universe might well be excused from explaining, also, that existence of objects, which is distinct f

return) Id., ib

well's "History of Inducti

ic system of Pythagoras. The most comprehensive and satisfactory exposition of his "method" is that given by Wm Ar

(return) Lectu

l relations of space, and determinate form, and number, in which the very idea of proportion seems to find its first and immediate development, and without the latter of which (number), all proportion is absolutely inconceivable. To this ar

n scarce be ascribed to an inferior nature? And on what other supposition are we to explain the identity which subsists between the principles of order, authenticated by the reason and the facts of order which are found to exist in the forms and multiplicities around us, and independent of us? Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the internal and external principles of a common nature? The proportions of the universe inhere in its divine soul; they are in

l when seen simultaneously; that is, the mind is made to delight in the unities of nature. At the basis of music there are certain fixed ratios; and in poetry, of every description, there are measures, and correspondencies. Pythagoras has often been ridiculed for his doctrine of "the music of the spheres;" and probably his doctrine was somewhat fanciful, but later science shows that there is a harmony in all nature--in its forms, in its forces, and in its m

to all which we can conceive as perfect; that is, it must be regulated by laws, of which we have the highest principles in those first and elementary properties of numbers which stand next to unity. "The world is then, through

f the universe. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks indeed of eternal truths, yet when the notion of symmetry and proportion is introduced, it is often necessary to insist, in prefer

of multitude, the all-pervading Unity has infused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his own image upon that world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and diversified--which we perceive as the combination of a thousand elements, yet as the expression of a single spirit--which is a chaos to the sense, a cosmos to the reason? What is it bu

wn incomprehensible essence all the relations of the universe. This soul has three elements, Reason (νο??), Intelligence (φρ?ν), and Passion (θυμ??). The two last, man has in common with brutes, the first is his grand and peculiar characteristic. It has,

nity--evil, essential plurality and division. In the fixed truths of mathematical abstractions he found the exemplars of social and personal virt

ed the Monad as God, the Duad as matter, the Triad as the complex phenomena of the world, the

Aristotle, "Nichomachia

ect, of phenomena and substance, perceptible only in thought; and the mind which has been disciplined to abstract thought by the study of mathematics, is prepared and disposed for purely metaphysical studies. "The looking into mathematical learning is a kind of prelude to the contemplatio

nous, "Introduction to the

existence of an external world is maintained by various hypotheses and reasonings, the consequence will be a species of Hypothetical Dualism or Cosmothetic Idealism. But if the affirmations of reason, as to the unity of the cosmos, are alone accepted, and the evidence of the senses, as to the variety and multiplicity of the world, is entirely disregarded, then we have a system of Absolute Idealism. Pythagoras regarded the harmony

f Elea. He left Ionia, and arrived in Italy about the same time as Pythagoras, bringing with

Struck with this idea of harmony and of unity, Xenophanes, who was a poet, a rhapsodist, and therefore by native tendency, rather than by intellectual discipline, an Idealist, begins already to attach more importance to unity than multiplicity in his phi

from the outward universe (τ? πολλ?) on the one hand, and from the "non-ens" on the other. It was his disciple, Parmenides, who imagined the logical necessity of identifying plurality with the "non-ens" and thus denying all immediate cognition of the phenomenal world. The compactness and logical coherence of the system of Parmenides seems to have had a peculiar charm for the Grecian mind, and

Cousin, "History of Phi

1, 332 of Butler's "Lectures," vol. i. His authorities are "Fragments of Xe

tic force, the anthropomorphic absurdities of the popular religion. This one God, he taught, was self-existent, eternal, and infinite; supreme in pow

all beings, divine a

like unto mortals

, no organs, as

all ear, all

, he sways all things b

that, by the "one God," Xenophanes meant a Personal God; and he asserts that his Monotheism was Pantheism. A doctrine, however, which ascribes to the Divine Being moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which ack

istory of Philosophy," p. 38; Ritter's "Histor

r's "History of Ancient Phil

," vol. i. p. 331, note; Ritter's "Histor

he only sources of knowledge, he held that they furnish the mind with two distinct classes of cognitions--one variable, fleeting, and uncertain; the other immutable, necessary, and eternal. Sense is dependent on the variable organization of the individual, and therefore its evidence is changeable, uncertain, and nothing but a mere "seeming." Reason is the sa

only "the one." Whatever, therefore, manifests itself in the field of sense is merely illusory--the mental representation of a phenomenal world, which to experience seems diversified, but which reason can not possibly admit to be other than "immovable" and "one." There is but one Being in the universe, eternal, immovable, absolute; and of this unconditioned being all phenomenal existences, whether mat

r's "History of Ancient Phil

urn) Id., ib., vol

e fragments of the Eleatics," 453 and who had a copy of the philosophic poems of Parmenides. He assures us that Parmenides and Xenophanes "affirmed that 'the One,' or unity, was the first Principle of all,....they meaning by this One that highest or supreme God, as being the cause of unity to a

. He was, says Diogenes Laertius, "the inventor of Dialectics." 455

"Biographical History

Encyclop?dia Britannica

udworth's "Intellectual

urn) "Lives," p. 3

(return) Pla

any." His grand position was that all phenomena, all that appears to sense, is but a modification of the absolute One. And he displays a vast amount of dialectic subtilty in the effort to prove that all "appearances" are unreal, and that all movement and change is a mere "seeming"--not a reality. What men call moti

wes's "Biographical Histo

r's "History of Ancient Phil

us that "Zeno endeavored to demonstrate that there is but one God, from the idea which all men have of him, as that whic

of the universe. The reader will be struck with the resemblance which subsists between the history of its development and that

the human mind--the intuition of unity--"or the desire to comprehend all the facts of the universe in a single formula, and consummate all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditioned existence." The h

udworth's "Intellectual

ton's "Metaphysics," vol. i.

systems of speculative thought which divided the ancient world. Here are the head-waters of the sensational and the idealist schools. The Ionian school started its course of inquiry in the direction of sense; it occupied itself solely with the phenomena of the external world, and it sought this principle of unity in a physical element. The Italian school started its course of inquiry in the direction of reason; it occupied itself chiefly with rational conceptions or à priori ideas, and it sought this pri

each, within its sphere, final and decisive. The duality of consciousness was not accepted in all its integrity; one school rejected

Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who recognized the partial and exclusive character of both these systems, and sough

ian idea of a spirit distinct from, and independent of the world, which has within itself the principle of a spon

Cousin, "History of Phi

ch are infinitely divisible. He imagined that, in nature, there are as many kinds of principles as there are species of compound bodies, and that the peculiar form of the primary particles of which any body is

one fro

ryon; nerve fro

ood, by countless

golden atoms,

reme; from fier

limpen dews. An

that kinds perpe

ihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti). But he saw, nevertheless, that the simple existence of "inert" matter, even from eternity, could not explain the motion and the har

a principle, infinite, independent (α?τοκρατ??), omnipresent (?ν παντ? παντ?? μο?οα ?νον), the subtilest and purest of things (λεπτ?τατον π?ντων χρημ?των κα? καθαρ?

rn) Good's translat

rn) Diogenes Laerti

ler's "Lectures on Philoso

of the phenomenal world, and he also believed in the real existence of "The Infinite Mind," whose Intelligence and Omnipotence were manifested in the laws and relation

r reports; but they reported only in regard to phenomena. The senses, then, perceive phenomena, but it is the reason alone which recognizes noumena, that is, the reason perceives being in and through phenomena, substance in and through qualities; an anticipation of the fundamental principle of modern psychology--"that every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so far only, as we know its phenome

ed in Athens, and the latter attended his school. The influence which the doctrine of Anaxagoras exerted upon the mind of Socrates (leading him to recognize Intelligence as

(return) "Ph

) Aristotle's "Metaph

ms of thought, which are subsequently discussed by Plato and Aristotle, were started, and received, at least, typical answers in those schools, we can not hope to understand Plato, or Aristotle, or even Epicurus, or Zeno of Cittium, u

Philosophy," p. 114; Butler's "Lectures on

SOCRATIC

lone was the sole criterion of truth. As the last consequence of this imperfect method, Leucippus had denied the existence of "the one," and Zeno had denied the existence of "the many." The Ionian school, in Democritus, had landed in Materialism; the Italian, in Parmenides, had ended in Pantheism; and, as the necessary result of this partial and defective method of inquiry, which ended in doubt and contradiction, a spirit of general skepticism was generated in the Athenian mind. If doubt be cast upon the veracity of the primary cognitive facult

Sextus Empiricus gives the psychological opinions of Protagoras with remarkable explicitness. "Matter is in a perpetual flux, whilst it undergoes augmentations and losses; the senses also are modified according to the age and disposition of the body. He said, also, that the reason of all phenomena resides in matter as substrata, so that matter, in itself, might be whatever it appeared to each. But men have different perceptions at different periods, according to the changes in the things perceived....

Encyclop?dia Britanni

?νθρωπο?--"the individual is the measure of

wes's "Biographical Histo

(return) "Gorg

turn) Plato's "Th

opposite and contradictory meanings; and all language and all opinion may, by such a process, be rendered uncertain. One opinion is, consequently, for the individual, just as good as another; and all opinions are equally true and untrue. It was nevertheless desirable, for the good of society, that there should be some agreement, and that, for a

o) spoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to be simil

d. He therefore turned away from physical inquiries, and devoted his whole attention to the study of the human mind, its fundamental beliefs, ideas, and laws. If he can not penetrate the mysteries of the outer world, he will turn his attention to the world within. He will "know himself," and find within himself the reason, and ground, and law of all existence. There he discovered certain truths which can not possibly be questioned. He felt he had within his own heart a faithful monitor--a conscience, which he regarded as the voice of

oniac something (το δαιμ?νιον, or δαιμ?νιν τι), or of a sign, a voice, a divine sign, a divine voice" (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 166). "Socrates always speaks of a divine or supernatural somewhat ('divinum quiddam,' as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to divine, and

n) Maurice's "Ancien

on, connecting appearance with reality, and constituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute truth? Socrates may not have held the doctrine of ideas as exhibited by Plato, but he certainly believed that there were germs of truth latent in the human mind--principles which governed, unconsciously, the processes of thought, and that these could be developed by reflect

eturn) Plato's "

c thought, and, by universal consent, he is placed at the commencement of a new era in philosophy. Schleiermacher has said, "the service which Socrates rendered tο philosophy consisted not s

uction conducted? By observing and enumerating the real facts which are presented in consciousness, by noting their relations of resemblance or difference, and by classifying these facts by the aid of these relations. In other words, it is analysis applied to the phenomena of mind. 477 Now Socrates gave this method of psychological analysis to

's "Lectures on the History o

le's "Metaphysics," vol. xii.

hts; to lead them from the particular and the contingent, to the universal and the necessary; and to teach them to test their opinions by the inward standard of truth, was the aim of Socrates. These dialogues are a picture of the conversations of Socrates. They are literally an education of the thinking faculty. Their purpose is to discipline men to think for themselves, rather than to furnish opinio

," "The Rivals," "First and Second Alcibiades," "The

red him wise because he knew nothing," he did not mean that true knowledge was unattainable, for his whole life had been spent in efforts to attain it. He simply indicates the disposition of mind which is most befitting and most helpful to the seeker after truth. He must be conscious of his own ignorance.

orship so universally characteristic of humanity. 480 He appealed to the consciousness of absolute dependence--the persuasion, wrought by God in the minds of all men, that "He is able to make men happy or miserable," and the consequent sense of obligation which teaches man he ought to obey God. And he regarded wi

an not read the arguments he employed without being convinced that he anticipated all the subsequent writers on Natural Theology in his treatment of

rn) "Memorabilia,"

(return) Ibid.

ristodemus concerning the Deity; for, observing that he never prayed nor sacrif

y,--'Name some of them, I pray you,' said Socrates. 'I admire,' said Aristodemus, 'Homer for his Epic poetry, M

t who forms images void of motion and intelligence, or one who has skill to

istodemus, 'provided the production was not the

e use of, while we can not say of others to what purpose they are pro

m it of those whose fitness and utility are

s, which, because the eye of a man is so delicate in its contexture, hath therefore prepared eyelids like doors whereby to secure it, which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again close when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, with a fence on the edge of them to keep off the wind and guard the eye? Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse, is prepared to turn off the sweat, which falling from the forehead might enter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us. Is it not to b

he more evident it appears to me that man must be the masterpiece of some great Artificer,

ou also knowest to be a portion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a part, while the rest of the elements contribute out of their abundance to thy formation. It is the soul, then, alone, that intellectual part of us, which is come to thee by some lucky chance, from I know not where. If

s; 'for I behold none of those gods whom you speak of as framing and gover

t assuredly governs thy body; although it may well seem, by thy man

contrary, I conceive so highly of their excellency, as t

t magnificence they have shown in their care of thee

ld persuade myself the gods take care of man, I

any things for use, and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hath been bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, hath the power of forming words with it whereby to explain his thoughts and make them intelligible to others? But it is not with respect to the body alone that the gods have shown themselves bountiful to man. Their most excellent gift is that of a soul they have infused into him, which so far surpasses what is elsewhe

odemus, 'what things I ought or ought not to do, in l

dness, and make discovery of his wisdom by consulting him in our distress, do thou, in like manner, behave towards the gods; and if thou wouldst experience what their wisdom and their love, render thyself deserving of some of those divine secrets which may not be penetrated by man, and are imparted to those alone who co

translation, in "Biog. Histor

e appropriate destiny of man. He was convinced that a future life was needed to avenge the wrongs and reverse the unjust judgments of the present life; 483 needed that virtue may receive its meet reward, and the course of Providence may have its amplest vindication. He saw this faith reflected in the universal convictions of mankind, and the "common traditions" of all ages. 484 No one refers more frequently than

"Apology," § 32, p. 3

484: (ret

(return) "Ap

certainly the first to place it upon a philosophic basis. The Ph?do presents the doctrine and the reasoning by which Socrates had elevated his mind above the fear of death. Some of the arguments may be pu

Justice was the cardinal principle which must lie at the foundation of all good government. The word σοφια--wisdom--included all excellency in personal morals, whether as

's "Lectures on Ancient Philo

uiry, which, in Plato and Aristotle, we shall see applied. He gave a new and vital impulse to human thought, which endured for ages; "and