A Handbook of the Boer War

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aken in the district controlled by him, which extended from the corner between the Vaal and the Western Railway almost to the Magaliesberg, and for which on the British side

rted by 700 men and two guns, was near Yzer Spruit within a day's march of its destination, when it was ambushed in the dawn and captured by Delarey, Kemp, and Liebenberg, who thus easily obtained what they were most in need of, namely transport animals, guns, and ammunition to the amount of half a million

hird was regular infantry with four field guns, and the remainder samples of almost every irregular corps that had been raised during the previous twelve months; an

teen miles south of Lichtenburg. He arrived there on March 7; Methuen, who was delay

upon his right flank. The mounted troops, which were promptly disposed as a screen, failed ignominiously, the greater part of them leaving the field in disorder. The regular infantry stood fast with the guns, but were soon overwhelmed. Grenfell was unable to intervene, but he strengthened Lichtenburg in ca

soon a force 14,000 strong was assembled there and elsewhere. The difficulty of the task before it was enhanced by the absence of a network

and between the Boers and that line. To drive Delarey on to it, they must rapidly place themselves west of him; and this could be done on

prisoners and three guns were taken. As in the earlier drives in the Orange River Colony, the meshes of the net were spacious and fragile. Delarey, Kemp, and Steyn escaped; and even Liebenberg, when about to s

in marched to the west, with instructions to form a line of three en

her to the west on March 31. Cookson, who was in charge of the expedition, at the end of a march of thirty-five miles, during

only cover available to the defence was the almost dry bed of the river. He threw out screens and proceeded to entrench and form a laager; while the screens faced in the open the fire of the enemy under cover in the bush on the high ground. Liebenberg

confusion ensued, as the Boers in the bush immediately fell upon it, but their attempt to get at the main position on the river, though supported by artillery,

ue, but the cessation of the firing and the reports of stragglers led him to the conclusion that Cookson had been annihilated. He reported to that effec

ters W. Kitchener's co-operation in the quest and was relying on it; but a column comm

o signally failed to bring Delarey to book was now manifest; and Ian Hamilton, who had greatly distinguished himself in

e to sweep over the country with a swing at first grazing Hart's River, then the Vaal, and finally coming to rest at Klerksdorp. Only four days were allotted to the movement, which began on April 10 and

himself in rear of Rawlinson. Kemp was observing the movement, and assumed that he had located the British right, whereas Kekewich had partly r

not yet formed up, and by which Potgieter's men were again mistaken for a portion of Rawlinson's column. The error was discovered, but not too late. The Boer attack, which for sheer reckless bravery could hardly be surpassed, and which has been compared to the Dervish charge at Omdurman, was made in the open against a considerable force, was repelled; and Potgieter fell dead at the head of his commandos. Rawlinson hurried up to the sound o

y a column from the Vaal under Rochfort, began a westward drive in the Transvaal, with 17,000 men. Kemp followed the usual practice of Boer commandants when hard pressed by the enemy, and scattered his commandos