With the British Army in The Holy Land

ially continuous line from the sea at Gaza to Arab el Teeaha, where the left flank was bent back or "refused" at or about Sheria. Some 4? miles farther on were the detached works covering Beersheba,

fall; so another operation, on as large a scale as the available force would permit, and calculated both to mystify the enemy and to draw off a portion of his reserves, was undertaken on

peration, in order to secure the water supply at that place, and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction the main attack was to be developed. When Beersheba was in our hands, we should have a

eira-Sheria line were considerable. Foremost among them were our old friend, th

s before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been captured. Arrangements had therefore to be made to ensure that the troops could be kept supplied with water, while operating

through Hebron to Jerusalem. North-west a good road led along the enemy's front to Gaza. The railway line, avoiding the heights, for the first ten or twelve miles follows approximately the direction of the Gaza road, and then turns northwards along the Plain or Foothills. But south of the Gaza-Beersheba

s, had to be allotted to one portion of the eastern force, to enable it to be kept supplie

for this railhead to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible from Shellal towards Karm (some 7 miles to the east-south-east of Shellal), and for a line to be laid from Gamli towards Beersheb

onnoitring party that the Turks sent out from the direction of Kauwukah to make a rec

htly. On the 30th, warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship, began co-operating in this bombardment. The actual

Wadi Saba were to be masked with the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53rd Division further north covered the left of the Corps. The right of the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted troo

ing, an attack was made upon the enemy's advanced works on the high ground about a couple of miles south-west of the town, at Hill 1070. This had been successfully accomplished by 8.45 a.m., and the cutting of the wire proceeded satis

about Khasim Zanna, in the hills, some 5 miles east of Beersheba. From the hills, the advance into Beersheba from the east and north-east lies over

ce met with some opposition, and was engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaly and to the north during

mounted attack by Australian Light Horse, who rode straight at the town from the East, proved completely successful. They galloped

etachment at Beersheba almost completely put out of action. This success l

n Gaza, which was designed to draw hostile reserves towards that sector, should take place a day or two before the attack on the Sheria position. A

e front of the attack was about 6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the farthest objective, was over 3,000 yards from our front line. The ground over which the attack took place consisted o

the main attack. It was accordingly attacked and captured at 11.0 p.m. on the 1st November by a portion of the 52nd Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of Umbrel

, with the co-operation of tanks and the accompaniment of other products of modern science. It was successful

succeeded in its primary object, which was to prevent any units being withdrawn from the Gaza defences to meet the threat to the Turkish left flank and to draw into Gaza as large a proportion as possible of the available Turki

ly holding on to the positions already captured, wh

ct of securing the flank of the attack on Sheria, while mounted troops were sent north along the Hebron road. Accordingly, the 53rd Division took up a position from

e right flank-guard; our main attack, which was to be delivered against Sheria, was not timed to commence until two or three days later. However, the enemy elected to employ the whole of his available reserves in an immediate counter-attack. During the 4th and 5th he made several determined attacks on the mounted troops in this locality. These attack

which lay east of the railway line. Meanwhile, London and Irish troops moved towards the Kauwukah system, bringing forward their guns to within wire-cutting range. Soon after noon, these troops commenced their attack upon the south-eastern face of the Kauwukah system. This was completely successful in capturing all its objectives. Sheria station was also reporte

site our right flank-guard. In the Sheria-Hareira locality, the Hareira Tepe Redoubt was captured at dawn. Tel el Sheria was c

, south of the town, which met with little opposition. "As soon, after they had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward, the enemy was found to be gone. Early in the morning, the main enemy force occupied the northern

y making any stand there. This force reached the Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishing itself on the north bank in the face of considerable opposition from a Turkish rearguard. Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of G

October "liveliness" was increasing all round, and mutual bombardments were growing more intense. Fortunately, a large number of the shells fired by the enemy were "duds." We were puzzled at the time to know why duds figured so largely in this and following bombardments; subsequent inspection of the enemy trenches afforded an explanation. G

ssness of attempting, without artillery preparation, a raid against an alert enemy well entrenched with wire intact. They were beaten off, and withdrew to a fold in the ground a couple of hundred yards out in No Man's Land, where they were fired upon by our trench mortars. Nevertheless they managed to rally, and came forward again to the attack. This time their reception was no more encouraging than before; our artillery got into them with a barrage and they withdrew. Now they sent up a red Verey light signal, whereupon a hostile barrage came down upon our trenches, under cover of which they not only wit

oint of view, the patrol heard sounds of an enemy concentration in their front trenches, in apparent preparation for another raid on the Apex. Our artillery put salvoes at once upon those trenches; and the raid of that night proved a damp squib. About midnight we were wakened from our slum

re to assist in the bombardment. Next morning the ground looked like a veritable sea beach after a wreck; the litter consisted of splinters and duds of all sizes and descriptions, largely 5.9" H.Es. This hostile barrage made a really satisfactory job of the wire cutting. As soon as it lifted, the enemy's infantry made a determined effort to penetrate our line. During the bombardment our fellows had taken shelter in the narrow passage ways behind the traverses, and so lost no time, immediately the barra

on the 6th and 7th. On the 8th, we were relieved at the Apex by Lines of Communication troop

owing chapters, are from General Allenby'